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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ACTIVE FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL DESIGN FOR NONLINEAR
SYSTEMS
by
Ali Reza Abbaspour
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Kang K. Yen, Major Professor
Faults and failures in system components are the two main reasons for the instability and the degradation in control performance. In recent decades, fault-tolerant
control (FTC) approaches were introduced to improve the resiliency of the control
system against faults and failures. In general, FTC techniques are classified into
two major groups: passive and active. Passive FTC systems do not rely on the
fault information to control the system and are closely related to the robust control
techniques while an active FTC system performs based on the information received
from the fault detection and isolation (FDI) system, and the fault problem will be
tackled more intelligently without affecting other parts of the system.
This dissertation technically reviews fault and failure causes in control systems and
finds solutions to compensate for their effects. Recent achievements in FDI approaches, and active and passive FTC designs are investigated. Thorough comparisons of several different aspects are conducted to understand the advantages and
disadvantages of different FTC techniques to motivate researchers to further developing FTC, and FDI approaches.
Then, a novel active FTC system framework based on online FDI is presented which
has significant advantages in comparison with other state of the art FTC strategies.
To design the proposed active FTC, a new FDI approach is introduced which uses

vi

the artificial neural network (ANN) and a model based observer to detect and isolate faults and failures in sensors and actuators. In addition, the extended Kalman
filter (EKF) is introduced to tune ANN weights and improve the ANN performance.
Then, the FDI signal combined with a nonlinear dynamic inversion (NDI) technique
is used to compensate for the faults in the actuators and sensors of a nonlinear system. The proposed scheme detects and accommodates faults in the actuators and
sensors of the system in real-time without the need of controller reconfiguration.
The proposed active FTC approach is used to design a control system for three different applications: Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), load frequency control system,
and proton exchange membrane fuel cell (PEMFC) system. The performance of the
designed controllers are investigated through numerical simulations by comparison
with conventional control approaches, and their advantages are demonstrated.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

In this chapter, the basic concepts of fault, failure, fault detection and isolation
(FDI), and fault tolerant controller (FTC) are illustrated which will be helpful to
differentiate them with uncertainty, disturbances, observer, and robust controller.
Furthermore, faults and failure are categorized based on their cause, severity, and
location. In addition, to demonstrate the importance of a reliable controller, some
recent incidents related to the faults and failure in the controllers are reviewed.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the fault
and the failure problem, and discusses their effects on the control system. Section 3
illustrates the FTC concept and classifies them into two groups based on their need
of FDI in their design. Section 4 discusses the motivations for doing this research
work, and the contributions are summarized. Finally, in Section 5, the road-map of
this dissertation is presented.

1.2

Problem Statement

Faults and failures in the components of a control system can endanger the system stability and degrade its performance. Fault in a dynamical system can be
described as a deviation of the system structure or system parameters from a nominal situation [3]. The overall effect of a single fault in a system can be varied from
performance degradation to a total failure [4]. It is worthwhile to mention the difference between faults, and system uncertainties and external disturbances. The faults
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are those elements which should be detected and whose effects should be removed
by remedial actions. Disturbances and model uncertainties are nuisances, which are
known to exist but whose effects on the system performance are handled by appropriate measures like filtering or robust design. In theory, it has been demonstrated
that controllers can be designed to attenuate disturbances and tolerate model uncertainties up to a certain size while faults are more severe changes, whose effects on
the plant behavior cannot be surpassed by a fixed controller. The difference between
fault and failures should also be illustrated. A fault causes a change in the characteristics of a component such that the mode of operation or performance of the
component is changed in an undesired way. Hence, the required specifications for
the system performance are no longer met. In general, a fault can be worked around
by fault-tolerant control so the faulty system remains operational. In contrast to
this, the notion of a failure describes the inability of a system or a component to
accomplish its function. The system or component has to be shut off because the
failure is an irrecoverable event. Therefore, redundancy is the main solution in the
presence of a failure in the system. Fault, based on its location, can be classified to
sensor, actuator, and plant (component or parameter) faults [3].

In general, most of the classical control techniques assume that all the components in the system work correctly and the controller is designed based on this
assumption. Hence, the occurrence of faults in the system component would send
incorrect information to the controller, and subsequently, the controller will be misled based on the received false data. Figure 1.1 shows possible faults in a control
system. As can be seen in Fig. 1.1, faults based on their component type can be
classified in three categories:
Plant Faults: These faults change the dynamic I/O properties of the system.
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Figure 1.1: Potential faults in a control system.

Sensor Faults: The plant properties are not affected, but the sensor readings have
substantial errors.
Actuator Faults: The plant properties are not affected, but the influence of the
controller on the plant is interrupted or modified.
Faults and failures in a control system may occur due to various reasons, such as
• Interruptions in communication between the actuator/sensor and the control unit
due to severe vibration, improper connections, metal flakes separating, and short
circuit.
• Noise effect on the actuator/sensor due to environmental noise like a magnetic
field.
• Denial of service for a period of time due to processor speed and network bandwidth [5, 6].
• A fall in a supply voltage/current of the electrical actuator/sensor since they normally need a separated power supply [7].
• False data injection by a malicious intruder. In this kind of fault, an attacker
penetrates to the system communication and injects false data to actuators/sensors
to mislead the control system [8–11].
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• Floating actuator (control surface moves freely without providing any moment)
due to loss of hydraulic fluid [12, 13]. Float actuator failure has been reported as
the main cause of flight incidents such as Flight 123 (B-747, Japan 1985) [14], and
DHL A300B4 (A300, Baghdad, 2003) [13].
• Actuator runaway/hardover where the control surface moves at its maximum rate
limit and reaches its saturation limit. The actuator runaway can occur due to failure in an electronic component which leads to sending a random large signal to the
actuators causing the actuator to be deflected at its maximum rate to its maximum
deflection. This kind of failure has been reported as the main reason for several
aircraft crashes such as those of Flight 85 (B-747, Alaska, 2002) [15] (where the
lower rudder runaway led to full left deflection and caused the excessive roll of the
aircraft).
• Actuator lock/stuck can be caused by a mechanical jam due to lack of lubrication
or being locked by ice for example. This type of failure led to flight incidents such as
Flight 1080 (Lockheed L-1011, San Diego, 1977) [15], and flight 96 (DC-10, Ontario,
1972) [15].
Faults can be categorized based on their severity as well. In this study, we categorized faults into three major groups:
• Abrupt Faults: Abrupt faults can be defined as changes in parameter values, which
are faster than the nominal dynamic process. Since tracking fast changes is a difficult process based on residuals, the ability to detect these abrupt changes is a great
challenge for most of the fault detection algorithms [3]. Reference [16] considered
the occurrence of three types of abrupt faults, severe vibrations, metal flakes separating, and short circuit.
• Incipient Faults: The problem with incipient faults is their small effects on the
residuals, which could be hidden from the detection system. The sources of these
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faults are sensor/actuator inaccuracy or partial failure.
• Intermittent Fault: This kind of fault is a malfunction that occurs at irregular
intervals. This kind of fault, common in most systems, can be caused by various
contributing factors, i.e., improper connection of electrical wires to the sensors, actuators, etc. The complexity of the system increases the chance of the occurrence
of intermittent faults. Due to the inconsistent nature of the intermittent faults,
their detection is a great challenge for most of the detection algorithms. Figure 1.2
presents a graphical description of abrupt, incipient, and intermittent faults in the
system.
fault

fault

fault

time
Abrupt Fault

time

time
Incipient Fault

Intermittent Fault

Figure 1.2: The graphical description of abrupt, incipient , and intermittent faults.

1.3

Definition of Fault-Tolerant Controller

To improve the safety and reliability of control systems against fault and failures,
FTC approaches are introduced in recent decades. A control system that can automatically compensate for fault (and sometimes failures) effect in the system components while maintaining the system stability along with the desired level of overall
performance is called an FTC system [13, 17–19]. Generally, based on the dependency on the fault information, FTC systems can be categorized into two main
classes: passive FTC and active FTC. Passive FTC is an FTC system that does not
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rely on faulty information to control the system and are closely related to robust
control where a fixed controller is designed to be robust against a predefined fault
in the system [4, 13]. In general, redundancy is integrated into the passive faulttolerant control design to make them resilient against faults [18].

In contrast with passive FTC systems, active FTC systems perform based on
the occurred fault in the system. In such control systems, a fault detection and
isolation (FDI) unit is used to find the fault location and measure its size; then, a
supervisory controller decides how to modify the control structure and parameters
to compensate for the occurred fault in the system. Such modification can be varied
from control reconfiguration [20, 21] to managing redundancies [22], and analytical
redundancy [23–29]. Both active and passive approaches use different techniques for
the same purpose, however, due to their difference in their design approach, each
approach may result in some unique properties.
In the following, a brief illustration of the passive FTC, and active FTC are presented.

1.3.1

Passive FTC

This subsection reviews the recent research works in the field of passive FTC theory.
Passive FTC systems do not rely on the fault information, and their design is directly
integrated with the concept of redundancy. The concept of hardware redundancy in
passive FTC systems can be defined as the application of identical components with
the same input signal so that the duplicated output signal can be compared with
the main component to do fault detection using various methods such as majority
voting and limits checking [3]. As can be seen in Fig. 1.3, in passive FTC design,
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redundancy can be considered in the controller, actuators, plant components, and
sensors that the FTC system can switch to them in the presence of a fault in the
system.
Several approaches have been used in designing passive FTC varies from sliding
mode control (SMC) approach [30–32] to H∞ [33–35], Linear-Quadratic control
[36], fuzzy logic control [37, 38], Lyapunov-based control [39], and control allocation [40–42]. Such control strategies are commonly less complicated and are popular
due to their simplicity in design and application, less lag between fault occurrence
and accommodation, and their low computation load [4, 18, 43].
The main challenges of passive FTC can be summarized as
1) The extreme dependency on hardware redundancy: despite the reliability of hardware redundancy, they are expensive, and increase the needed space and the weight
of the product. It is obvious that the key components need redundancy to avoid
breakdown, but applying redundancy for the whole system would be costly, and
difficult to be applied considering the weight and space limits.
2) Passive FTC strategies rely on the assumption that the system will maintain its
asymptotic stability of the closed-loop under specified fault/failure scenarios. However, this assumption may not be sufficient to prevent system break down in the
presence of a large number and unforeseen faults.
3) Due to the fact that in passive FTC design the normal and fault/failure conditions should be considered simultaneously, in the performance aspect, they are more
conservative compared to active FTC design. In other word, passive FTC systems
focus on the robustness of the system considering all the scenarios rather than the
optimal performance for each scenario, i.e., in order to guarantee the stability of
the system in the presence of a fault, the settling time of the controller would be
increased even in a normal situation.
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Figure 1.3: Passive FTC Structure: This kind of controller can be designed by
considering redundant controller/actuator/plant/sensor and in the presence of fault
will switch to the redundant component.

1.3.2

Active FTC

In contrast with passive FTC systems, active FTC systems react to each fault
differently. This reaction is based on the control approach used in the active FTC
design and information received from the detection system. Generally, active FTC
design has three main steps: 1) Detection, 2) Supervision, 3) Control. Figure 1.4
shows the three main steps and their roles in designing active FTC systems.
Generally, in designing an efficient active FTC system, three major factor should
be considered: First, the detection unit should be accurate. False fault alarm and
inaccurate fault measurement have a direct impact on the performance of the active
FTC system. This inaccuracy will lead to the wrong reaction to the fault and would
even endanger the system stability. Second, the designed active FTC should be
robust against the imperfect fault detection information. Third, the time spent for
fault recovery should be less than the available time for recovery. In other words,
the control-reconfiguration/fault-compensation should be fast enough to guarantee
the system stability and performance.
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Figure 1.4: General Structure of active FTC systems.

1.4

Motivations, and Summary of Contributions

Fault tolerant control is one of the most attractive topics in the field of control
theory which received a great deal of attention among researchers. The ongoing
achievements in this field of control and the increasing need to develop a reliable
control system which can tolerate faults and failure are the main reasons that motivated us to work in this field of control theory.
Although the valuable efforts have been made in the last decades to provide comprehensive FTC and FDI approaches, most of the works are only based on hardwareredundancy, while analytical redundancy which has received a great deal of attention
in recent years has not been significantly investigated. In addition, most of the works
investigated FDI and FTC separately and the link between active FTC and FDI to
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obtain a united active FTC system was not technically investigated. These reasons
motivated us to work on this topic. In this dissertation, the latest achievements
in the field of fault tolerant control system are reviewed, and their advantages and
disadvantages are investigated, then a novel FDI technique is introduced which can
detect fault and failures in real time with relatively higher accuracy than conventional methods. This FDI technique consists of a model-based observer and an
adaptive artificial neural network (ANN) in which its learning coefficients are updated by the extended Kalman filter (EKF). The combination of the model-based
observer and ANN observer helped to reduce the uncertainties in the model-based
observer and at the same time reduced the computation load on the ANN in comparison with the conventional ANN detection methods. We demonstrated that the
application of EKF algorithm in tuning ANN weights helps to improve the ANN
accuracy and reduces its response time. In the next step, we introduced a new
active FTC based on our introduced FDI system. The proposed active FTC can
detect and compensate for the occurred fault based on the information received from
the FDI system. To the best of our knowledge, the problem of designing a united
framework for FTC which uses FDI information has not been solved. The proposed
active FTC system is evaluated through numerical simulations, and mathematical
analysis. Based on the proposed active FTC method, new controllers for different
complex systems are designed, e.g., unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), load frequency
control (LFC) system, and proton exchange membrane fuel cells (PEMFC) system,
and their advantages are demonstrated.
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1.5

Dissertation Road-map

The five main research themes of this dissertation can be described as follows:
√

Introducing a novel neural adaptive observer-based sensor and actuator fault

detection and isolation (FDI) in nonlinear systems.
√

Active fault tolerant control (FTC) based on neural adaptive observer for

nonlinear systems.
√

√

√

Active FTC design for UAV.

Active FTC Design for LFC system.

Active FTC Design for PEMFC system.

Accordingly, this dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 investigates the state of art FDI and FTC approaches. In this chapter,
the advantages and disadvantages of the different FDI and FTC approaches are
reviewed and solutions to improve their performance are suggested.
Chapter 3 introduces the proposed FDI and active FTC design, and their design
procedures are illustrated. Furthermore, the stability and efficiency of the proposed
designs for the nonlinear affine systems are mathematically proven.
Chapter 4 presents a new active FTC design for an UAV system based on the
approach introduced in Chapter 3. The proposed design is implemented on nonlinear
six-degree of freedom (six-DoF) model of an aircraft and the advantages of the
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proposed design are demonstrated through numerical simulations.
Chapter 5 proposes a new active FTC design for PEMFC system based on the
methodology described in Chapter 3. The effectiveness of the proposed design is
evaluated through numerical simulation.
Chapter 6 introduces a new resilient control design for LFC system based on the
results achieved in Chapter 3. The proposed design is evaluated through numerical
simulation and the effectiveness of the proposed design against false data injection
attacks is demonstrated.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation outcomes and discusses the findings and
implications for potential future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DESIGN FUNDAMENTALS

2.1

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the definition of fault, failure, fault detection and isolation
(FDI), and fault tolerant control (FTC) were discussed and the reasons for designing
a reliable controller was investigated. As it was discussed in the previous chapter,
the performance of the active FTC system relies on the accuracy of the FDI unit used
in its design structure; thus, an accurate FDI design with capability of online fault
detection and isolation is a must for the active FTC design. This chapter reviews
the state of the art FDI and FTC techniques, and investigates their advantages
and disadvantages. Furthermore, the solutions to improve their performances are
suggested.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2, FDI approaches are
reviewed and classified based on their design methodology. Section 3 reviews the
FTC approaches and classify them based on the methodology used in their design
for fault accommodation.

2.2

Fault Detection and Isolation

Although the terms “fault isolation” and “fault detection” are sometimes used synonymously, fault detection means determining that a problem has occurred, whereas
fault isolation pinpoints the size and location of the fault [44].
The first step in designing FDI is to design an observer to estimate the system states
and output. For simplicity, consider a linearized state-space model of a system as
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follows
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + fa (t) + fc (t) + d(t)

(2.1)

y(t) = Cx(t) + fs (t) + D(t)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the system states, u ∈ Rm is the control input, fa ∈ Rla , fc ∈ Rlc ,
and fs ∈ Rls are actuator, component, and sensor faults, respectively. A ∈ Rn×n ,
B ∈ Rn×m , and C ∈ Rn×m are the matrices of the state-space system. d(t) and D(t)
are unknown disturbances and uncertainties in the system states and the output.
The observer for the system described in (2.1) can be defined as
ˆ = Ax̂(t) + B û(t) + He(t)
ẋ(t)

(2.2)

e(t) = y(t) − C x̂(t)
where x̂(t), and û(t) are the estimates of system states and control input, and H is
the observer gain to be tuned by the designer to reduce the error or residual (e(t))
in the system. In other words, the residual shows the inconsistency between the
measured data and the expected data and is obtained through a recursive estimation process as follows

N ew P rediction = P redication + Gain × Residual
This well-known framework is the generalized likelihood ratio approach that was
introduced by Willsky and Jones [45] and have been used with different observer
approaches for estimation of the system states and then fault detection. Based
on this framework, a fault detection will be designed which alarms if the residuals
exceed a predefined threshold. Figure 2.1 shows the general structure of the FDI
system.
In this study, FDI approaches are classified based on the observer design in three
main categories: model-based approaches, knowledge-based approaches, and combined model-knowledge based approaches. Figure 2.2 shows the classification of FDI
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Figure 2.1: General structure of fault detection and isolation (FDI).

approaches based on the technique used in their design. It should be noted that the
combined model-knowledge based approaches can be varied as any combination of
the model-based and knowledge-based approaches.

2.2.1

Model based FDI

Model-based FDI is one of the oldest strategies in fault diagnosis which was introduced in 1971 [46]. Detailed investigation of model-based methods can be found in
well-written books [47, 48] and survey papers [49–51]. In model-based techniques,
the mathematical model of the operation system (plant) is required. This model can
be obtained through physical approaches or system identification methods; then, an
observer will be designed based on this model to estimate the system output and
monitor the consistency between the estimated output and the practical system
output. Fault can be detected and isolated by subtracting the system output from
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Figure 2.2: Classification of the FDI approaches based on their methodology. (The
abbreviations: KF (Kalman Filter), EKF (Extended Kalman Filter), UKF (Unscented Kalman Filter), SMO (Sliding Mode Observer), PCA (Principal Component
Analysis), ICA (Independent Component Analysis), PLS (Partial Least Square),
SVM (Support Vector Machine), ANN (Artificial Neural Networks)

the predicted output. Different model-based approaches have been used to design
the observer such as Kalman filter [52–57], H∞ [58–62], and sliding mode observer
(SMO) [63–65].

2.2.1.1

Kalman Filter-based

Kalman filter observers are efficient recursive filters which estimate internal states of
the linear dynamic system from a series of noisy measurements based on minimization of the mean square variance of the estimation error. This minimization of error
is based on the linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) optimization problem. Mannandhar et al. used a Kalman filter to estimate the system states and then a χ2 detector
was used for fault alarm in the presence of a fault and false data injection attack in
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the system [52]. Other statistical tools can also be used for alarming the system if a
particular fault occurs, e.g., generalized likelihood [45], multiple hypothesis test [66],
and cumulative sum algorithms [67]. Figure 2.3 shows the general structure of the
Kalman filter observer in designing the FDI system.
Kalman filters are commonly used for linear systems, and it can obtain an unbiased

r (k )

y (k )

Industrial Process

FDI

Performance
Model

yˆ(k )

xˆ(k  1)
Unit Delay
xˆ(k )

Kalman Filter

Kalman filter-based Observer

Figure 2.3: General structure of Kalman filter-based fault detection [1].

minimum estimation error variance if only the noise in their measurements satisfies
the Gaussian assumption. To overcome these deficiencies of the Kalman filters, they
have been modified, e.g., extended Kalman filter (EKF) [55, 56], unscented Kalman
filter (UKF) [57], and Hybrid Kalman filter (HKF) [53].
One solution to apply Kalman filter to nonlinear system is to linearize the system
around its state using Taylor expansion series and modify the filter to use this linearized version of the system as a model which is called EKF [68]. An adaptive
two-stage EKF with covariance matrix adoption was designed to detect faults in
an inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensors of an aircraft [55]. In [56], adaptive
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EKF was used for FDI in a series of the battery pack to prevent overcharge and
over-discharge. In their approach, the states of each battery cell were estimated
using EKF, and they identified a fault in the system by comparison of the measured
values with the estimated values.
However, the computation burden on EKF is heavier than the Kalman filter, and
sometimes this linearization is not accurate which subsequently converges to the
wrong solution. In order to tackle these deficiencies, instead of linearization of the
nonlinear system, an alternative solution was introduced which is unscented transformation. The unscented transformation is a deterministic sampling technique that
picks a minimal set of sample point (called sigma points) around the mean. Then,
by propagation of the sigma points through the nonlinear functions, a new mean and
covariance estimation will be formed which is called UKF [69]. In addition, UKF
removes the need for direct calculation of Jacobian and obtains it through sigma
points propagation without the need for analytical differentiation; this will reduce
the computational burden for complex functions. However, similar to the EKF, this
filter may become unstable in some highly nonlinear systems and converges to the
wrong solution. In [57], UKF was used to detect faults in the reaction wheels of a
spacecraft where particle swarm optimization was used off-line for tuning the initial
parameters of the UKF. Pourbabaee et al. introduced a multiple-model (MM) HKF
approach for FDI which incorporates a nonlinear mathematical model of the system
with a number of piecewise linear models [53].

2.2.1.2

Unknown Input Observers

Unknown input observer (UIO) is a type of the Luenberger observer which is primarily used for state estimation in linear systems. The major advantage of this kind
of observer is its ability in the complete decoupling of the estimated states from the
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unknown inputs under certain conditions. The reason that this kind of observers
is called UIO is the fact that the state estimation error is free from any unknown
inputs [48].
Recently, standard UIO approaches have been developed to be applied to the
nonlinear systems using linear parameter varying (LPV) process. These developments can be categorized in two aspects: 1) using linear matrix inequalities (LMI)
technique to obtain required conditions of UIO observers for LPV systems [70–74], 2)
integration with other robust control techniques to improve FDI performance [75].
For example, an H∞ filter was integrated to UIO to detect a failure in inertial
measurement unit (IMU) of a robot manipulator [75]. The H∞ filtering helped to
guarantee the boundedness of the estimation error against input noise.

2.2.1.3

Robust Fault Detection

In the FDI process, the residual signals should be robust to uncertainties while being
sensitive to faults to have an accurate fault detection. To this aim, robust control
techniques were combined with model-based observers to improve the robustness of
the FDI. Among robust approaches, H∞ and sliding mode have received a great deal
of attention in designing robust FDI systems. In [58,60,62], H∞ norm has been used
to reflect the maximum influence of disturbances, and the residual generation in FDI
process was formulated as the H∞ optimization problem. In addition, the norms
H∞ , H− , and H2 can be used to measure the sensitivity of the residuals to fault
occurrence, and then, between the sensitivity to fault and robustness to disturbance
an optimization problem can be defined for the performance indices of H∞ /H∞ ,
H− /H∞ , and H2 /H∞ . Based on this theory, the FDI design can be converted to a
multi-objective optimization problem [61, 76, 77].
It should be mentioned that the online implementation of the above optimization
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problem depends on the complexity of its Riccati equation which has a direct relation to computation time. Recursive algorithms have been proposed to simplify
the online implementation and reduced computational load. One of these recursive
algorithms is Kerin space technique which is a special type of indefinite-matrix space
and can share many properties with Hilbert space and at the same time preserving
the required characteristics of the H2 and H∞ . Particularly, for estimation problem
(Kalman-like filters), it allows the application of recursive algorithms to solve H2
and H∞ problems [78]. Due to these advantages, the Kerin space have been used
broadly in designing optimal FDI based on different recursive algorithm [79–83]

The sliding mode observer (SMO) has been widely used for state estimation of
uncertain and nonlinear systems in recent decades. This wide application is because
of SMO robustness to uncertainties and its capability of reconstructing uncertainties
based on the concept of the equivalent injection of the exogenous input [84]. In this
concept, SMO observers estimate the system states and output based on an exogenous input which forces the estimation error to be converged to zero in finite time
steps [65,84]. Walcott and Zak introduced one of the first Lyapunov-based SMO for
dynamic systems with bounded disturbances [85] and developed to be applied to a
more general class of nonlinear systems in [86, 87]. Drakunov and Utkin introduced
the first SMO observer based on the idea of equivalent control concept [88] which
was later applied to a class of nonlinear system with triangular input form [89]. The
sliding mode term was incorporated in high-gain observer (HGO) to design a robust
nonlinear observer for a class of nonlinear Lipschitz system [90], where the unknown
disturbances can be identified by sliding surfaces.
The implicit or explicit use of differentiation in the SMO process makes them relatively restricted to one degree. To tackle this restriction, the high order sliding
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mode observers were introduced to remove the relative degree restriction and obtain
a better FDI accuracy [84, 91–94]. The application of sliding mode observers have
been widely investigated for linear time-invariant (LTI) systems, and the required
conditions for SMO were defined as matching and minimum phase conditions [95].
However, satisfying these two conditions is difficult when it comes to FDI for linear
discrete time-varying (LDTV) systems, hence, high order SMO came as a solution
to relax these restrictions [84]. Based on these achievements, different SMO approaches have been modified for FDI in linear and nonlinear systems [93, 94].
The main advantage of the SMO observer is their strong robustness to bounded robustness. However, this strong robustness make them insensitive to incipient faults
when they have small size during the initial phase; consequently, the system might
be vulnerable to the incipient fault. To tackle this problem, in [96,97], a Luenberger
observer was integrated to SMO to improve its ability in the detection of an incipient fault in sensors. Incorporating adaptive thresholds in the residual analysis is
another way to improve the performance of SMO [63].

Overall, the dependency of the model-based FDI approaches to the accuracy of
the dynamic model can be considered as their main weakness, other than that, the
summarized advantages and disadvantages of the model-based FDI techniques are
presented in Table 2.1.

2.2.2

Knowledge-based Approaches

On the contrary of model-based approaches which require a prior known model of
the system, knowledge-based approaches are not dependent on the system model
and require a large volume of historical data of the system performance. Various
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Table 2.1: Summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of the model-based FDI
approaches.
Approach Advantage

Disadvantage

KF

Low computation load and guaranteed Cannot be applied to nonlinear systems
convergence for linear systems with or linear systems without Gaussian disnoise
tribution

EKF

Heavier computation load than KF, and can be
Can be applied to nonlinear system.
only implemented on systems with Gaussian disRobustness against the unmodeled dytribution. Errors related to the linearization of
namics, model uncertainties, and disEKF may reduce the estimation accuracy or can
turbances.
even result in filter divergence.

UKF

Can be applied to nonlinear systems
and lower computation load than EKF

UIO

Its ability in the complete decoupling of
Cannot be applied to highly nonlinear
the estimated states from the unknown
systems
inputs under certain conditions

H∞

Being robust against uncertainties and Vulnerable to incipient faults. Cannot
be applied to highly nonlinear systems
disturbances

SMO

Being robust against uncertainties and
Vulnerable to incipient fault
disturbances

Similar to EKF may be unstable to
highly nonlinear system

artificial intelligence methods have been applied for the detection of a fault in the
current historical data set of the industrial systems. Figure 2.4 shows the overall
block diagram of a knowledge-based FDI algorithm. Most of knowledge-based FDI
approaches are formulated to solve the diagnostic problem as a pattern recognition
problem. Therefore, the FDI problem can be solved either by using statistical or
non-statistical techniques. Thus, we classified the knowledge-based FDI approaches
to statistical-analysis-FDI and non-statistical-analysis-FDI.

2.2.2.1

Statistical-Analysis-FDI

In statistical FDI framework, most of the methods are based on the principal component analysis (PCA), Independent component analysis (ICA), partial least squares
(PLS), statistical pattern classifiers, and support vector machine (SVM) algorithms.
These algorithms require a large amount of historical data of the system performance
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Figure 2.4: General structure of knowledge-based FDI approaches.

to be trained for FDI application.

PCA is one of the most popular monitoring technique, which is used to find
factors with a much lower dimension than the original data set, hence the main
variations in the original data set can be correctly noticed [98]. FDI design based
on PCA methods have been successfully applied to complex systems, e.g., diagnosing faults in diesel engines [99], rolling bearing [100], electrical power drive [101], and
power inverters [102]. However, the fact that PCA can be only applied to Gaussian
distribution data limits their application for application in non-Gaussian distribution.

PLS is another statistical tool for FDI in industrial systems. Recent achievements in the implementation PLS-based FDI can be found on [103–107]. In [103],
dynamic PLS algorithm was used for dynamic modeling which was able to capture
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dynamic correlation between the measurement block and the quality data block;
then, for FDI purpose, a total PLS (T-PLS) was introduced to further decomposition of the obtained PLS structure. The proposed T-PLS method was able to detect
quality-related anomalies in the system process. Ding et al. introduced an improved
PLS-based FDI scheme based on the key performance indicator [104]. In comparison
with standard PLS, their approach significantly reduced the computation load. An
FDI based on a combination of PLS method and pseudo-sample projection for the
complex nonlinear system was presented in [105]. Further investigation to improve
PLS-based FDI method were presented in [106, 107].

In statistical-based approaches, ICA has a key role in real-time monitoring due
to its ability to not restricting latent variables in following a Gaussian distribution. In [108], a kernel-ICA-based FDI was introduced for non-Gaussian nonlinear
systems. ICA has been successfully implemented for designing FDI in industrial
processes, e.g., rolling-element bearing [109], induction motor [110]. Recently, an
FDI design based on a combination of ICA and PCA was introduced in [111]. In
their approach, because PCA cannot deal with non-Gaussian process, ICA was used
for monitoring the non-Gaussian part of the process, and PCA was used for monitoring the Gaussian part. Then, a Bayesian network classifier was used to detect
the fault in the system.

Among statistical-based FDI techniques, SVM is relatively new and due to its
ability to work with large and low input features, has the potential to achieve more
generalization. Another advantage of the SVM is its ability with working with both
Gaussian distribution and non-Gaussian distribution data. In [112], most of the
SVM schemes in designing FDI dated to 2006 were reviewed. Recent studies of
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the SVM-based FDI can be found in [113–118]. In [113], an SVM-based FDI was
developed by integrating of a kernel function with cross-validation. They showed
that their proposed FDI algorithm has more accuracy than conventional PLS algorithms. In [114], a genetic algorithm was used to tune the SVM parameters to
improve the FDI performance. Yi and Etemadi introduced an FDI design for a
photovoltaic system based on multi-resolution signal decomposition and two-stage
SVM [115]. In their design, the multi-resolution signal decomposition algorithm was
used for feature extraction, and the two-stage SVM was used for decision making.
Various applications of the SVM for FDI design have been investigated, e.g., wireless
network sensor [116], ultrasonic flow meters [117], and ship propulsion system [118].

2.2.2.2

Non-Statistical-Analysis-FDI

Artificial neural network (ANN) is a powerful tool for the approximation of nonlinear systems and adaptive learning. Due to this ability, the ANN is the most popular
non-statistical data-driven tool for designing FDI systems. Based on the learning
strategy, the ANN can be classified into supervised FDI and unsupervised FDI. The
unsupervised learning ANN uses the historical data to obtain the knowledge of emulating of the normal behavior of the system, which will be used to compare with
the behavior of the real-time process to check if any deviation from the expected
behavior occurs or not. The supervised learning ANN has the knowledge of the
normal condition and faulty condition which will be used for FDI in a real-time
process. ANN-based FDI have been applied for various application, e.g., combustion engine [119], railway track circuits [120], wind turbine drive-train [121], and
microgrid system [122, 123].
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Fuzzy logic (FL) is another non-statistic approach which can be used for FDI. In
FL-based FDI, space features are partitioned into fuzzy sets, and then, fuzzy rules
are designed based on the human reasoning to analyze the system behavior. Figure
2.5 shows the overall block diagram of an FL based FDI system.
The FL has been successfully implemented for designing the FDI system. For example, in [124], an FL-based FDI design is introduced for the detection of intermittent
loss of firing pulses in the inverter power switches pulse-width modulation voltage
source inverter (PWM-VSI). In this design, the fault modes of the current analysis of
the PWM-VSI were used to extract fuzzy approximation model. Among various FL
approximation models, the Takagi-Sugeno (T-S) is the most efficient method which
received a great deal of attention [125–128]. Particularly, in [125–127], a T-S dynamic modeling technique was used to design the FDI system for general nonlinear
processes. To this end, a universal T-S fuzzy observer-based residual generator was
created by using fuzzy Lyapunov functions, then, it was integrated to an embedded
dynamic threshold to be applied for real-time FDI in an industrial process. Luo
et al. introduced a T-S approach for FDI in a class of network fuzzy systems with
multiplicative noises on measurement and states [128]. In their design, the T-S FL
FDI was constructed to generate the residual signal, and an adjustable threshold
was defined for efficient detection of the fault.
The summarized advantages and disadvantages of the reviewed knowledge-based
FDI strategies are presented in Table 2.2.

2.2.3

Combined Model-Knowledge based Approach

Model-based and knowledge-based approaches have their distinguished advantages
and various restrictions. Particularly, model-based FDI approaches can diagnose
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Figure 2.5: Fuzzy Logic (FL) based fault detection and isolation (FDI).

the fault with the minimum computation load which makes them suitable for the
real-time application. However, the accuracy of the detection depends on the accuracy of the mathematical model of the system. On the other hand, knowledge-based
approaches are not dependent on the system model which make them suitable for
complex industrial systems that their models are unavailable or difficult to obtain.
However, knowledge-based approaches need a large amount of data for training and
suffer from the high computational load, and they may not be able to detect undefined fault types. To leverage the advantages of these two types of FDI approaches
and reduce their inaccuracy and computational load, a combination of these two
methods was suggested. Talebi et al. introduced an integrated recurrent ANN
and nonlinear observer to design an FDI system for sensor and actuator faults in
a satellite [129]. The general structure of a combination of the model-based and
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Table 2.2: Summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of the Knowledge-based
FDI approaches.
Approach Advantage
Disadvantage
reducing the dimensionality of data,
can be only applied to Gaussian distriwhile keeping as much variation as
PCA
bution data
possible

ICA

SVM

ANN

Fuzzy

Can be applied to non-Gaussian distribution

The historical data must be statistically independent and must have non-Gaussian distributions

Ability with working with both
of Gaussian distribution and non- dependency to the kernel selection
Gaussian distribution
Ability with working with both
Need of huge historical data of the
of Gaussian distribution and nonsystem performance
Gaussian distribution
Being robust against uncertainties and
disturbances. This observer is only sensitive to the fault signal, and other
parameter variations and uncertainties
cannot deteriorate the FD performance

Vulnerable to the incipient fault.
Obtaining the fuzzy if-then rules needs
extensive expert knowledge of the
system.

ANN-based FDI strategy is presented in Fig.2.6.
A combination of the SVM and model-based observer were introduced to design
ANN
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Figure 2.6: General structure of the combined ANN and model-based approach.

FDI for chemical reactors by Sheibat et al. [130]. They found out using the only
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SVM for FDI would have difficulty to detect faults due to the highly nonlinear behavior of the system and transitional dynamics. Thus, they used a model-based
observer based on a simplified initial model and the SVM was used to correct the
uncertainties and nonlinearities of the system behavior. Their proposed approach
showed effectiveness in detection and isolation of the faults. Based on the design
procedure and criteria, different combinations of model and knowledge-based approaches can be applied to achieve an effective FDI, e.g., PLS and inverse dynamic
model observer [131], and hidden Markov model-based and ICA approach [132].

2.3

Active Fault Tolerant Control

Fault tolerant control (FTC) techniques can be divided into two main categories:
active and passive [133, 134]. Active FTC uses detection techniques to find the
fault, then, a supervisory system will decide how to modify the control structure
and parameters to compensate for the effect of the faults in the system [18]. But, in
passive FTC, a robust compensator is used to reduce the fault effects in the system
or at least stabilize the system in the presence of fault in the system.
Passive fault tolerant controllers have been used widely in the literature due to their
simplicity, low computation load, and robustness in small failures [31,34,35,38,135].
Various approaches have been used in designing passive FTC systems, from sliding mode control approaches [31] to fuzzy control [38] and H∞ approaches [34, 35].
Despite the advantages of passive FTC techniques, they suffer from several limitations [136]. First, they commonly employ hardware redundancy which increases the
cost and weight of the aircraft. Second, the controller design is based on conservative
principles that limit the agility of the controller, i.e., in order to keep the system stable in the presence of a fault, the settling time of the controller would be increased.
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Third, passive FTCs are designed to tolerate small fault while they might be vulnerable in the presence of sudden and severe faults in the system. For these reasons,
active FTC system received a great attention among the researchers [30, 137–144].

Active FTC approaches are mainly categorized based on the FDI unit used in
their design. However, the strategy used for the compensation of fault might be
different. Here, a brief review of different fault compensation approaches used in
active FTC design is presented.

2.3.1

Switching-Based Active FTC

This kind of the controller relies on a set of predefined candidate controllers and the
system switches among them based on the fault type and severity. Figure 2.7 shows
the overall block diagram of a switching-based active FTC system. An important
factor in designing a switching based controller is the dwell time [145]. The dwell
time is the lower band on the length of the time interval between the consecutive
switching instances. It should be noted that the upper-bound is the detection interval (DI) which is the length of time which the controller performance does not change
after the fault occurrence. Allerhand and Shaked introduced an active FTC technique considering the doweling time among switches which guarantees the stability
of the system by solving linear matrix inequalities [146]. In [147], a switching-based
controller without any extra models or filters is developed. In their design approach,
the bounds of the state were guaranteed during the switching delays.
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Figure 2.7: The general structure of the Switching-based active FTC system.

2.3.2

Hierarchical Structure Active FTC

Hierarchal structures are applied in the integration of FDI and FTC in active FTC
systems. In this strategy, after detection and isolation of the fault in the system,
the controller can be reconfigured either by adaptive control strategies [148, 149], or
receding horizon control [150].

2.3.3

Safe Parking Active FTC

The concept of “safe parking” was firstly introduced by Gandhi and Mhaskar [151].
This concept is based on the idea of maintaining the system at a proper temporary
equilibrium (safe parking) point in the presence of fault until the active controller
pushes the states of the system to a nominal equilibrium point. Later, this work was
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further developed to choose a “safe parking” point using the FDI information [152].
Similarly, Paolo and Lafotune used this concept to propose a “safe controllability”
method [153].

2.3.4

Analytical Feedback Compensation Active FTC

Analytical feedback compensation strategies are based on the real-time fault detection and isolation. These approaches need very accurate FDI information with minimum delay. The overall structure of the analytical feedback compensation method
for active FTC design is depicted on Fig. 2.8.
FDI
FDI
-

+
-

Controller
Controller

Actuator
Actuator

Plant

Sensors
Sensors

Fault Noise

Figure 2.8: The general structure of the analytical feedback compensation active
FTC system.

In [154], an online recursive identification method was used for FDI and was
integrated to a PID controller through a feedback signal to compensate the fault in
the system analytically. An active FTC system for a multi-agent leader-following
system based on wavelet neural network (WNN) was designed [155]. In their work,
a robust leader-follower controller based on graph theory was designed for the multiagent system, then, the WNN-based FDI was used to compensate for the fault in
the actuators through a feedback structure.
In [156], an integral-type robust sliding mode controller was designed based on
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the feedback data from the iterative learning FDI unit which could map analytical
redundancy in an optimal manner.

2.3.5

Hybrid FTC

Hybrid FTC systems are introduced to leverage the advantages of passive and active
FTC at the same time [140]. Based on this idea, the passive controller is used as
a safe controller until a reliable controller based on the information received from
FDI unit is achieved. Based on this concept, the controller has more amount of
time to obtain accurate fault information, and optimal control reconfiguration can
be performed without the concerns about system safety.
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CHAPTER 3
ACTIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL DESIGN

3.1

Introduction

Active fault tolerant control (FTC) techniques perform based on the received data
from the fault detection and isolate (FDI) unit. These controllers have advantages
over the passive FTC due to their intelligent reaction to faults, which leads to
minimizing the effect on the faultless part of the control system.
In this chapter, we introduced a novel active FTC system design for nonlinear
affine systems which can detect the fault and compensate for its effect without the
need of control reconfiguration. The proposed active FTC design consists of a new
ANN-based FDI system, a feedback linearization controller, and a new feedback
structure which compensates the occurred fault based on the information received
from the FDI system. The proposed FDI system uses an extended Kalman Filter
(EKF) algorithm to update ANN weights to improve the accuracy and response time
of the ANN-based fault detection system. The convergence of the update process of
the ANN using EKF and the stability of the proposed FDI system is mathematically
proven using the nonlinear Lyapunov functions. Based on the proposed FDI system,
a novel active FTC design is introduced in the next step, and its mathematical
stability is demonstrated using the nonlinear Lyapunov functions. To the best of
our knowledge, the problem of designing a united framework for FTC which uses
FDI information has not been solved before this study. The main contributions of
this work can be summarized as 1) a new FDI design for nonlinear affine system is
introduced, 2) a novel nonlinear active FTC design for nonlinear affine systems is
developed, 3) the proposed design helps to detect and isolate abrupt faults without
the need of control reconfiguration which is a challenge for other FTC designs.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the design
procedure and the stability proof of the proposed FDI system, while Sections 3 and
4 illustrate the FDI design for actuators and sensors, respectively. In Section 5 the
proposed FTC design is presented, and its mathematical stability is investigated.

3.2

Proposed FDI Method

In this section, our proposed strategy for FDI in general nonlinear systems is illustrated. The proposed strategy is a combination of the model-based and knowledgebased approaches to leverage the advantages of both types of strategies.
Consider a nonlinear system described by


ẋ(t) = f x(t) + g x(t) u(t) + D(x, t) + fa (x, t)

y(t) = h x(t) + fs (x, t)

(3.1)

where u(t) ∈ Rm is the input vector, y(t) ∈ Rr is the output vector, x(t) ∈ Rn is the
state vector, f : Rn → Rn is the state function, g : Rn → Rn×m is the input function,
D ∈ Rn is the system’s uncertainties and disturbances, h : Rn → Rr is the output
function, and fs (x, t) and fa (x, t) are the sensor fault and actuator fault vectors,
respectively, whose elements describe the faults in the system. Due to the fact that
nonlinear models have some level of uncertainty, using only a nonlinear model-based
observer cannot accurately determine the faults in Equation (3.1); thus, an extra
term is needed to find the fs (x, t) and fa (x, t). In this dissertation, a neural network
adaptive structure (NNAS) is used to detect the faults in sensors and actuators.
The nonlinear model-based observer provides the expected output, while the NNAS
detects and identifies the fault using the actual output and the expected output. In
order to have a stable NNAS, several assumptions are considered :
Assumption 1: All of the state variables in x(t) are measurable.
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Assumption 2: An upper bound for the plant uncertainties D(x, t) is assumed
(kD(x, t)k ≤ χmax ). This assumption can be achieved by using a nonlinear model
with a sufficient level of accuracy.
Assumption 3: The state function f (x(t)) can be differentiated at x̂(t)
A(t) =

∂f (x(t))
|x(t)=x̂(t)
∂x(t)

where A(t) is an n × n matrix.
The Taylor series expansion of f (x(t)) at x̂(t) can be represented as
f (x(t)) − f (x̂(t)) = A(t)x̃(t) + Θ(x̂(t), x(t))
where Θ(x̂(t), x(t)) = o(kx̃(t)k2 ) contains the higher order terms of the state estimation error. Here, x̃(t) = x(t) − x̂(t).
Assumption 4: The control input function g(x(t)) and Θ(x(t), x̂(t)) satisfy the
Lipschitz condition, i.e.,
kg(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))k ≤ Lg kx̃(t)k
kΘ(x̂(t), x(t))k ≤ LΘ kx̃(t)k
with the Lipschitz constants Lg and LΘ , respectively. Here, we assume the detection
system is accurate and the detection error is bounded by Lg and LΘ . The validity
of this assumption will be proven in the following subsection.
Assumption 5: The control input vector of the system is bounded by Lu and the
fault, F (t), is bounded by LF , i.e.,

ku(t)k ≤ Lu
kF (t)k ≤ LF
Here, the actuation output and the occurred fault are considered to be bounded.
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With the above assumptions, NNAS stability can be guaranteed, and its proof
is discussed in the following.

3.2.1

NNAS

The proposed FDI technique is a neural netwrok (NN)-based detection design in
which its learning weight are updated online through the EKF algorithm. This FDI
strategy is adopted due to its accurate and fast detection ability. In the following,
the proposed NNAS is presented.
Faults in a system may be nonlinear and unpredictable; hence, ANN can be a
suitable candidate for their estimation. Unlike the direct ANN modeling procedures
that uses an ANN to simulate the system behavior [157, 158], the NNAS detects
faults based on the output of the nonlinear observer
x̂˙ = f (x̂(t)) + g(x̂(t))u(t) + Mi (t)

(3.2)

ŷ = h(x̂(t))

where x̂(t) is the state vector of the nonlinear observer and M (t) is the neural
network observer that defined as [159]:
Mi (t) = Wi (t)σ (Vi (t)δi (t))

(3.3)

where Mi (t) is the ith vector of M (t) for i = 1, ..., n. Wi (t) and Vi (t) = [Vi,1 (t), ..., Vi,m+n (t)]
are the weights associate with the ith output of the NNAS at time t. Here, δi (t)
can be defined as δi (t) = [Mi (t − τ ), ..., Mi (t − mτ ), ei (t − τ ), ..., ei (t − nτ )]T . Here,
τ indicates the sampling period or the step size of the observer; ei (t) = yi (t) − ŷi (t),
and σ(.) is a tanh activation function which is selected due to its gradient strength.
σ(x) = (1 − e−x )/(1 + e−x )
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(3.4)

In terms of the ith element Mi (t) of M (t) for i=1,...,n, the NN observer can be
represented as
Mi (t) = Wi (t)σ(Zi (t))

(3.5)

where
Zi (t) =

m
X

Vi,j (t)Mi (t − jτ ) +

j=1

n
X

Vi,m+j (t)ei (t − jτ )

(3.6)

j=1

The input of the observer M (t) is recursively updated with the previous m samples
of the observer inputs for j = 1, 2, ..., m, and also previous n samples of the system
output error ei (t − jτ ) for j = 1, 2, ..., n. Here, m and n are chosen based on
the needed accuracy and training time in the system. Large values of m and n
guaranty the convergence of the training and the accuracy of the ANN; however,
large values of them may increase the computation time and add unnecessary delays
by increasing the training duration [159]. Thus, to have a real-time and accurate
fault detection, m and n should be chosen based on the needed accuracy and the
system bandwidth.
Subtracting the observer Equation (3.2) from the nonlinear system Equation (3.1),
the error of the state estimation for the actuator can be obtained as follows:

˙
x̃(t)
= A(t)x̃(t) + Θ(x̂, x) + g(x) − g(x̂) u(t) + fa (x, t) − M (t) + D(x, t)
According to Assumption 3, A(t) is an n × n matrix defined as A(t) =

(3.7)

∂f
| ,
∂x x=x̂

and

f (x) − f (x̂) = A(x)x̃(t) + Θ(x̂, x).
Likewise, the error of the estimation for the sensor can be obtained by the following
formula
ỹ = y(t) − ŷ = h(x(t)) − h(x̂(t)) + fs (x, t) − M (t)
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(3.8)

3.2.2

Neural network weight update law

In order to achieve real-time performance, the NN weights should be tuned effectively [160]. In this study, an adaptive tuning algorithm based on EKF is introduced.
The EKF helps to update the NN weighting parameters online, so that fast convergence rate of the NN learning will be guaranteed. Through the updating process,
if we consider the ith element of NNAS, then the EKF updating parameter can be
described by [159]:
θi (k) = [Wi (k), Vi,1 (k), ..., Vi,m+n (k)]T

(3.9)

where k is the kth sampling instant, and t = kτ . The parameters will be calculated
in each sampling time with the following rules [159].
θi (k) = θi (k − 1) + ηi Ki (k)[yi (k) − ŷi (k)]
Ki (k) = Pi (k)Hi (k)[Hi (k)T Pi (k)Hi (k) + Ri (k)]−1

(3.10)

Pi (k + 1) = Pi (k) − Ki (k)Hi (k)T Pi (k)
where ηi is the learning coefficient, Pi (k) is the covariance matrix of the state estimation error, Ki (k) is the Kalman gain, and Ri (k) is the covariance matrix of the
estimated noise, which is computed recursively by [161]:


Ri (k) = Ri (k − 1) + eTi (k)ei (k) − Ri (k − 1) /k

(3.11)

Here, Hi (k) is the derivative of ei (k) with respect to θi (k). Based on the observer
input in Equation (3.5), Hi (k) can be calculated as follow:
Hi (k) =
(
=

∂ei (k)
|θi =θi (k−1)
∂θi

σ(Zi (k)),

θ i = Wi

Wi (k)Mi (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,j

Wi (k)ei (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,m+j

Figure 3.1 shows the overall structure of the proposed NNAS method.
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(3.12)

Initializing the EKF parameters by designer

yˆ 0 , P0 , R0 ,0 , H 0 , K 0
Updating parameters
updating Pi(k) and Ri(k)

Pi (k  1)  Pi (k )  Ki H i (k ) Pi (k ),
Ri (k )  Ri (k  1)  ei (k ) 2  Ri (k  1)  / k
Online updating of the Kalman gain

Ki (k )  Pi (k )Hi (k )  Hi (k )T Pi (k )Hi (k )  Ri (k )

yi (k ), yˆi (k )

1
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M i (t )

Figure 3.1: Block diagram of the updating process of the ANN with the EKF.

3.2.3

Stability Analysis of ANN Updating Based on EKF

In order to guarantee the convergence and stability of the EKF law for updating
NNAS, the following assumption is made.
Assumption 6: For single input, single output (SISO) systems, the noise estimated
variance, Ri (k), satisfies the following condition
0 < Ri (k) << Hi (k)T Pi (k)Hi (k)

(3.13)

Theorem 2.1: The EKF algorithm can update the NNAS parameters described in
Equation (3.5) if the learning coefficient satisfies the following rule
0 < ηi < 2 +

2Ri (k)
kHi (k)kλmax (Pi (k))
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(3.14)

then, the updating process is convergent.
Proof : According to the assumption, if (3.14) is satisfied, then
0 < ηi < 2 +

2Ri
HiT Pi Hi + Ri
=
2
HiT Pi Hi
HiT Pi Hi

(3.15)

Therefore,
0 < ηi HiT Pi Hi [HiT Pi Hi + Ri ]−1 < 2

(3.16)

By defining Ki (k) = Pi Hi [HiT Pi Hi + Ri ]−1 , we have:
0 < ηi Hi (k)T Ki (k) < 2

(3.17)

The Lyapunov function considered is
1
V (k) = ei (k)2
2

(3.18)

while the difference of V (k) can be obtained as


1
∆V (k) = V (k + 1) − V (k) = ∆ei (k) ei (k) + ∆ei (k)
2

(3.19)

where the error difference, ∆ei (k) , is approximated by

T
∂ei (k)
∆ei (k) = −
∆θi (k) = −ηi Hi (k)T Ki (k)ei (k)
∂θi (k)

(3.20)

So, ∆V (k) is equal to




1
1
T
T
∆V (k) = ∆ei (k) ei (k)+ ∆ei (k) = −ηi Hi (k) Ki (k) 1− ηi Hi (k) Ki (k) ei (k)2
2
2
(3.21)
If the condition in (3.15) is satisfied, then according to Equations (3.17) and (3.20),
∆V (k) < 0. Hence, the updating operation will be convergent.
Remark 2.1: In order to guarantee the condition in the assumption, it is common practice to choose a large identity matrix for the initial value of Pi (k), so it
can be assured that Ri (k) << Hi (k)T Pi (k)Hi (k) .

41

3.2.4

The Overall Stability of The NNAS

The stability of the NNAS input, Mi (t), is investigated next. The value of Mi (t) is
updated at each sample time and defined by
Mi (k + 1) = Wi σ

X
m


Vi,j Mi (k − j + 1) + Bi (k)

(3.22)

j=1

where Bi (k) =

Pn

j=1

Vi,m+j ei (k − j + 1) is the bias. By defining z(k) as z(k) =

[z1 (k), . . . , zm (k)]T , where zj (k) = Mi (k − j + 1), for j = 1, . . . , m, a new state
vector of the observer input will be obtained. Then, the NNAS input can be written
as:
zm (k + 1) = Wi σ

X
m


Vi,j zj (k) + Bi (k)

(3.23)

j=1

The stability of zm (k) is clear because zj (k) is bounded, i.e., (zj (k) ≤ ±W ), due to
the bounded nature of σ(•). Consider the equilibrium point of Equation (3.23) as
∗
]. Based on the recursive property of the state z, and the fact that
z ∗ = [z1∗ , . . . , zm

at the equilibrium point z(k + 1) = z(k) = z ∗ , the equilibrium point of the state
equation can be represented as
∗
zm

= Wi σ

X
m

Vi,j zj∗


+ Bi (k)

(3.24)

j=1
∗
.
where z1∗ = z2∗ = · · · = zm

The stability of the equilibrium point of (3.23) can be proved by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.2: If the absolute value of Wi ∆

Pm

j=1

Vi,j is less than one, then the

equilibrium point z ∗ in (3.24) is asymptotically stable, where ∆ is described by

X

m
1
2
∗
∆= 1−σ
Vi,j zp + Bi (k)
2
j=1
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(3.25)

∗
Proof : zm (k + 1) can be approximated around the equilibrium point zm
by Taylor

series expansion as



zm (k + 1) = Wi σ
=
j=1 Vi,j zj (k) + Bi (k)


Pm
Pm
∗
∗
Wi σ
j=1 Vi,j zm + Bi (k) + Wi ∆
j=1 Vi,j (zm (k) − zm )
where Wi ∆

Pm

j=1

Pm

(3.26)

Vi,j is the first-order derivative of zm (k + 1) at the equilibrium

∗
∗
point zm
, and 0 < ∆ < 12 . Thus, the equilibrium point zm
is asymptotically stable
P
if |Wi ∆ m
j=1 Vi,j | < 1 . Hence, Theorem 2.2 is proved.

Remark 2.2: In a faultless system with an ideal observer, ei (k) is equal to zero.
Consequently, Mi (k) becomes independent, and Theorem 2.2 is directly applicable
to this case. On the other hand, in a faulty system, Bi (k) in (3.22) will be nonzero
P
( ei (k) 6= 0 ). Thus, to satisfy Theorem 2.2 , the value of Wi ∆ m
j=1 Vi,j must be
adjusted to make the system stable. Hence, the stability of both of the faultless and
P
the faulty systems can be proved by Wi ∆ m
j=1 Vi,j . When there is no fault in the
system, Mi (k) converges to a zero equilibrium point, otherwise, Mi (k) converges to
a nonzero equilibrium point, i.e., values of fault in sensor fs (k) or actuator fa (k).
The stability of the nonlinear NNAS-based FD system is proved using the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.3: Consider the nonlinear system described in (3.1), and the NNAS
described in (3.3). According to Assumptions 1-5, if the condition in Equation (3.27)
is satisfied, then the error of the state estimation x̃(t) is bounded, i.e.,
λmin (Q) > 2LΘ β + 2Lg Lu β + δm

(3.27)

qP
n
2
where δm =
j=1 δj and fsj − Mj (k) is the detection error which yields kfs −
qP
n
2
M (k)k <
j=1 δj = δm .
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Proof: In order to prove the stability of the estimation error x̃(t), a Lyapunov
function is defined as
V (x̃(t), t) = x̃T (t)Φ(t)x̃(t)

(3.28)

where Φ(t) is a positive definite matrix, and x̃(t) = x(t) − x̂(t). The derivative of
this Lyapunov function with respect to t can be obtained as follows:
˙ T Φ(t)x̃(t) + x̃(t)T Φ̇(t)x̃(t) + x̃(t)T Φ(t)x̃(t)
˙
V̇ (t) = x̃(t)

(3.29)

By substituting the state error equation (3.7) into (3.29), and according to the
result from the proof of convergence of the parameter updating process, we have:


T
T
V̇ (t) = x̃(t) A(t) Φ(t) + Φ(t)A(t) + Φ̇(t) x̃(t) + 2x̃(t)T Φ(t)Θ(x, x̂)




T
T
+2x̃(t) Φ(t) g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t) u(t) + 2x̃(t) Φ(t) fs − M (t)
≤ −λmin (Q)kx̃(t)k2 + 2LΘ kΦ(t)kkx̃(t)k2 + 2Lg Lu ke(t)k2 kΦ(t)k + 2kx̃(t)k2 kΦ(t)kδm


2
2
2
2
2
≤ −λmin (Q)kx̃(t)k + 2LΘ kΦ(t)kkx̃(t)k + 2Lg Lu kx̃(t)k kΦ(t)k + δm kx̃(t)k + kΦ(t)k


≤ − λmin (Q) + 2LΘ β + 2Lg Lu β + δm + δm β 2
(3.30)
where β is a positive bounded real value. Therefore, if the equation (3.27) is satisfied,
then
V̇ (t) ≤ −γkx̃(t)k2 + δm β 2

(3.31)

where γ = λmin (Q) − 2LΘ β − 2Lg Lu β − δm .
The above inequality guarantees that V̇ (t) < 0 when kx̃k >

q

δm β 2
.
γ

Since δm , β,

and γ are bounded and positive variables, when k → ∞, the estimation error will
converge to a sufficiently small bound; subsequently, the condition (3.27) is adequate
for guaranteeing the stability of the state estimation error x̃(t) .
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3.3

Actuator FDI Design

Here, the design procedure of the proposed actuator FDI using NNAS will be explained. Reminding Equation (3.1), a nonlinear system described by


ẋ(t) = f x(t) + g x(t) u(t) + D(x, t) + fa (x, t)

y(t) = h x(t) + fs (t)

(3.32)

where fa (x, t) is the fault which occurs in the actuator, and fs (t) is the sensor fault.
Considering Equations (3.32) , the FDI design for the actuators an affine nonlinear
system can be presented by

û = g(x)−1 (ẋ(t) − f x(t))
(3.33)
ũ = u − (û + Mi (t))
where û in Equation (3.33) represents the nonlinear observer model of the actuator,
ũ is the FDI error which is used as an NN input in δi (t), and Mi (t) which is updated
at each sample time can be described with the following equation.
Mi (k + 1) = Wi σ

X
m


Vi,j Mi (k − j + 1) + Bi (k)

(3.34)

j=1

where Bi (k) =

Pn

j=1

Vi,m+j ei (k − j + 1).

Figure 3.2 shows the block diagram of the proposed procedure for FDI design of
actuators in a nonlinear system.

3.4

Sensor FDI Design

Similar to actuator FDI design which was described in the previous subsection,
a neural adaptive observer for sensor fault detection in a general affine nonlinear
system (described in Equation (3.32)) can be be presented as:
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Actuator Fault Detection
System
EKF

M i (t )

u
NNAS

Fault Noise

-

+

+

+

Nonlinear Observer
uˆ   x  f ( x)  g ( x) 1

-

+
Controller

x  f ( x)  g ( x)u

Actuator

Sensors

Nonlinear Model

Figure 3.2: Block Diagram of the proposed FDI for actuators in nonlinear systems.

ŷ(t) = x̂(t) + Mi (t)

(3.35)

ỹ(t) = y(t) − ŷ(t)
where x̂ is the nonlinear observer obtained based on the system model (Equation
(3.32)), and Mi (t) can be calculated as follow
Mi (t) = Wi (t)σ

X
3


Vi,j Mi (t − jτ ) + Vi,j (t)ỹ(t − τ )

(3.36)

j=1

The overall structure of the proposed FDI design for sensors is depicted in Fig.
3.3. As it can be seen in this figure, for fault detection in the sensors, the nonlinear
observer can be obtained using Equation (3.32) where the nonlinear observer estimates the expected sensor output the fault can be identified based on the ỹ(t) used
in Equation (3.36). The updating process of the ANN using EKF were discussed in
details in previous subsections.
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Sensor Fault Detection
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Nonlinear Model
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Figure 3.3: Block Diagram of the proposed FDI for actuators in nonlinear systems.

3.5

Proposed Active FTC Design Resilient

In this section, the proposed active FTC technique is illustrated. This technique
is based on the analytical redundancy and online fault detection and belongs to
“analytical feedback compensation active FTC” group which was discussed in the
previous chapter.
Consider a nonlinear affine system as follows


ẋ(t) = f x(t) + g x(t) u(t) + D(x, t) + fa (x, t)

y(t) = h x(t)

(3.37)

where u(t) ∈ Rm is the input vector, y(t) ∈ Rr is the output vector, x(t) ∈ Rn is
the state vector, f : Rn → Rn is the state function, g : Rn → Rn×m is the input
function, D ∈ Rn is the systems uncertainties and disturbances, h : Rn → Rr is the
output function, and fa (x, t) is the actuator fault vector, whose elements describe
the actuator faults in the system. The proposed controller for this nonlinear system
consists of two parts: 1) the nonlinear feedback linearization controller, and 2) the
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adaptive fault compensation feedback controller.

3.5.1

Nonlinear Feedback Linearization Controller

Feedback linearization technique eliminates the need for gain scheduling by inversion and cancellation of the inherent dynamics and replacement of a set of desired
dynamics in the control loop. Consider the nonlinear system described in Equation
3.37, the feedback linearization controller for this system can be obtained
u=g

−1





x(t) ẋd (t) − f x(t)

(3.38)

where ẋd (t) is the derivative of the desired states that can be controlled through
a linear stabilizer controller, i.e., a proportional-integral (PI) controller. It should
be noted that by choosing sufficiently large gains in the stabilizer controller, the
stability of g(x) and its inverse matrix will be guaranteed [162]. The PI controller
can be obtained by defining a new controller input as follows:
Z
ν = ẋd (t) − k1 e − k2

e dt

(3.39)

where e = x − xd , k1 is the proportional control gain and k2 is the integral gain.
Considering (3.39), the error dynamics can be obtained as:
ë + k1 ė + k2 e

(3.40)

Thus, the desired stabilizing controller can be designed by appropriately choosing
the roots of “s” in s2 + k1 s + k2 . In addition, the overshoots can be minimized by
considering the following conditions: k1 ≤ 4k2 [163, 164].
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3.5.2

Adaptive fault compensation feedback controller

As can be seen in Equation (3.38), the problem of disturbances and fault cannot
be tackled in feedback linearization controller, thus, the following modification is
suggested to make the controller resilient to fault and disturbances.
u=g

−1

x(t)





ẋd (t) − f x(t) + D(t) + F (t) − M (t)


(3.41)

where F (t) is the fault in the actuator and M (t) is the FDI output designed for detection of fault in the actuators described in the previous chapter. Figure 3.4 shows
the block diagram of the proposed active FTC system for actuator faults in nonlinear systems. The mathematical stability of the proposed controller is investigated
in the following subsection.
Fault Detection Process
EKF
EKF

uˆ (t )

u (t )

-

M (t )

+

Nonlinear
Nonlinear
Observer
Observer

Active Fault Tolerant controller
Commands

-

Stabilizer
Stabilizer
Controller
Controller

Feedback
Feedback
Linearization
Linearization
Controller
Controller

-

u (t )
Actuator
Actuator

x  f ( x)  g ( x)u

Sensor
Sensor

Fault Noise

Figure 3.4: Block Diagram of the proposed Active FTC for actuator fault in nonlinear systems.
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3.5.3

Active FTC Stability Analysis

To prove the stability of the designed active FTC system, we make the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1: The state function f (x(t)) can be differentiated at x̂(t)
Q(t) =

∂f (x(t))
|x(t)=x̂(t)
∂x(t)

where Q(t) is an n × n matrix.
The Taylor series expansion of f (x(t)) at x̂(t) can be presented as

f (x(t)) − f (x̂(t)) = Q(t)x̃(t) + Θ(x̂(t), x(t))

(3.42)

where Θ(x̂(t), x(t)) = o(kx̃(t)k2 ) contains the higher order terms of the state estimation error. Here, x̃(t) = x(t) − x̂(t).
Assumption 2: The output function h(x(t)) and the control input function g(x(t))
satisfy the Lipschitz condition, i.e.,
kh(x(t)) − h(x̂(t))k ≤ Lh kx̃(t)k
kg(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))k ≤ Lg kx̃(t)k
with the Lipschitz constant Lh and Lg , respectively. Here, we assume the detection
system is accurate and the detection error is limited by Lg and Lh . The accuracy of
the FDI system used in this work was investigated in the previous section we proved
that detection error will be converged to zero.
Assumption 3: The control input vector of the system is bounded by Lu and the
fault in the actuator, F (t), is bounded by LF , i.e.,

ku(t)k ≤ Lu
kF (t)k ≤ LF
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Here, the actuation output and the occurred fault are considered to be bounded.This
assumption can be always held by implementing a saturation filter with the amplitude of ±900 to guarantee that the deflection of the actuators will not be over ±900 .
Assumption 4: Θ is bounded by a positive real number LΘ such that
kΘ(x̂(t), x(t))k ≤ LΘ kx̃(t)k
This assumption is also related to the accuracy of the fault detection system that
was proven in the previous section.
Assumption 5: The matrix P (t), a symmetric matrix, that satisfies the following
condition:

λ1 In ≤ P (t) ≤ λ2 In
where λ1 and λ2 are positive real numbers and P (t) can be found by solving the
following Lyapunov equation:
QT (t)P (t) + P (t)Q(t) + Ṗ (t) = −Γ

(3.43)

where Γ is a symmetric positive definite matrix.
Now, by subtracting the observer equation
x̂˙ = f (x̂(t)) + g(x̂(t))u(t) + M (t)
from the nonlinear system equation
ẋ = f (x(t)) + g(x(t))u(t) + F (t)
and substituting (3.42), the effect of the fault detection error on the system x̃(t) can
be written as
˙
˙
x̃(t)
= ẋ(t) − x̂(t)


= Q(t)x̃(t) + Θ x̂(t) , x(t) + g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t)) u(t)
+F (t) − M (t)
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(3.44)

Theorem: With the Assumptions 1-5, the fault effect in Equation (3.44) is bounded
on x̃(t) if the following condition is satisfied
ηmin (Γ) > 2LΘ λ2 + 2Lg Lu λ2 + 2La λ2

(3.45)

where kF (t) − M (t)k ≤ La . λ2 and La are both finite positive constant.
Proof: A Lyapunov function is selected as follows
V (x̃(t), t) = x̃(t)T P (t)x̃(t)

(3.46)

Based on Assumption 5, we can conclude that V (x̃, t) ≥ 0 for the estimation error
x̃(t). Now for the stability consideration of the proposed FTC system we need to
show that V̇ (x̃, t) < 0 The derivative of the V (x̃, t) with respect to time t can be
expressed as
˙ T P (t)x̃(t) + x̃(t)T Ṗ (t)x̃(t) + x̃(t)T P (t)x̃(t)
˙
V̇ (x̃, t) = x̃(t)
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(3.47)

˙
By substituting x̃(t)
from Equation (3.44) into V̇ (x̃(t), t) in (3.47), we have


V̇ (x̃, t) = Q(t)x̃(t) + Θ(x(t), x̂(t))+
T
(g(x) − g(x̂)) u(t) + F (t) − M (t) P (t)x̃(t)

+x̃T (t) −QT (t)P (t) − P (t)Q(t) − Γ x̃(t)

+x̃T (t)P (t) Q(t)x̃(t) + Θ(x(t), x̂(t))

+ (g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))) u(t) + F (t) − M (t)

= x̃T (t)QT (t)P (t)x̃(t) + ΘT (x(t), x̂(t))P (t)x̃(t)
+uT (t) (g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)+
(F (t) − M (t))T P (t)x̃(t)
−x̃T (t)Q(t)P (t)x̃(t) − x̃T (t)P (t)Q(t)x̃(t)
−x̃T (t)Γ(t)x̃(t) + x̃T (t)P (t)Q(t)x̃(t)
+x̃T (t)P (t)Θ(x(t), x̂(t))x̃(t)
T

+x̃ (t)P (t) (g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))) u(t)
+x̃T (t)P (t) (F (t) − M (t))

= ΘT (x(t), x̂(t))P (t)x̃(t) + x̃T (t)P (t)Θ(x(t), x̂(t))
+uT (t) (g(x(t) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)
+x̃T (t)P (t) (g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))) u(t)
+ (F (t) − M (t))T P (x)x̃(t)+
x̃T (t)P (t) (F (t) − M (t)) − x̃T (t)Γx̃(t)

= 2ΘT (x(t), x̂(t))P (t)x̃(t)
+2uT (t) (g(x(t) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)
+2 (F (t) − M (t))T P (t)x̃(t) − x̃T Γx̃(t)
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(3.48)

Now, substituting the conditions in Assumptions 2-5, we have
V̇ (x̃(t), t) = 2ΘT (x(t), x̂(t))P (t)x̃(t)
+2uT (t) (g(x(t) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)
+2 (F (t) − M (t))T P (t)x̃(t) − x̃T Γx̃(t)

(3.49)

≤ 2kP (t)kLΘ kx̃(t)k + 2Lg Lu kP (t)kkx̃(t)k
+2kP (t)kLa kx̃(t)k − Γx̃(t)
≤ (−ηmin (Γ) + 2LΘ λ2 + 2Lg Lu λ2 + 2La λ2 ) kx̃(t)k2
Hence, to have a stable FTC, we must have

−ηmin (Γ) + 2LΘ λ2 + 2Lg Lu λ2 + 2La λ2 < 0
or
ηmin (Γ) > 2LΘ λ2 + 2Lg Lu λ2 + 2La λ2
which gives the sufficient condition of the stability. Thus, the condition in Equation
(3.45) is sufficient to guarantee the convergence of the fault effect x̃(t) on the system
to a small bounded value.
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CHAPTER 4
A NEURAL ADAPTIVE ACTIVE FTC DESIGN FOR UAV

4.1

Introduction

Faults in aircraft actuators can cause serious issues in safety. Due to the autonomous
nature of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), faults can lead to more serious problems in these systems. In this chapter, a new active fault tolerant control (FTC)
system design for an UAV is presented. The proposed design uses a neural network adaptive structure (NNAS) for fault detection and isolation (FDI), then, the
FDI signal combined with a nonlinear dynamic inversion (NDI) technique is used to
compensate for the faults in the actuators. The proposed scheme detects and isolates faults in the actuators of the system in real-time without the need of controller
reconfiguration in the presence of faults in the actuators. The simulation results of
the designed FTC system when it is applied to WVU YF-22 UAV show that the
proposed design can successfully detect and isolate the faults and compensate for
their effect. The rest of this section reviews the fault effect on aircraft systems, FTC
approaches used in flight control systems, and the main contributions of this chapter.

Faults and interruptions in flight control systems can cause serious safety problems for aircraft. Due to this fact, flight control systems need a highly reliable design.
For UAVs, there is no opportunity to fix the faulty component after launching. In
order to develop systems with satisfactory performance, controllers with the ability to tolerate potential faults should be considered. These reliable controllers are
known as fault-tolerant control (FTC) systems. FTC systems have been developed
to be able to control the system when malfunctions occur in system components.
However, the conventional feedback control approaches are designed based on the
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assumption that all the components work in an ideal condition which may not provide satisfactory results in faulty situations. Thus, FTCs have received much of
attention in the recent decade [165–169]. Active FTC system has superiority over
passive FTC due to their intelligent reaction faults based on the fault severity and
the fault location.

Generally, active fault tolerant techniques can be designed for both linear and
nonlinear systems. Linear models are popular in the literature due to their ease of
use and simplicity [30,138–140]. Ye et al. presented an adaptive trajectory tracking
FTC system based on the online estimation of an eventual fault, which has been
applied on a linear time-invariant (LTI) model of F-16 aircraft [138]. Alwi and Edward introduced an online sliding mode control (SMC) allocation scheme which was
capable of tolerating faults in the actuators of the aircraft linear model [30]. In [139],
Alwi and Edward modified their SMC design [30], by adding a back-stepping structure that in a faultless situation, the system switches to the backstepping controller
to obtain a better control performance. Yu et al. introduced a hybrid FTC system
which was able to reduce the rate of the fault effect on the system with minimal
fault information which gives some extra time to fault detection and isolation (FDI)
techniques to detect the fault more accurately [140].

Due to the complex and nonlinear behavior of the aircraft dynamics, linear control strategies are not a suitable candidate for an accurate and reliable control
system. For this reason, nonlinear control strategies were used to design FTC systems [142–144]. Gao et al. presented an active FTC design based on adaptive sliding
mode technique for a reusable launch vehicle (RLV) [142]. The active FTC system
was designed for the actuators in the reentry phase of the RLV. The design was
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based on reconfigurable control strategy that after detection of a fault, the system
can switch between predesigned controllers. However, these switching controllers
often suffer from the lag between the switches, which makes them unreliable for agile systems like jet UAVs. Park et al. analyzed the intentional attempts to disrupt
the flight system through the satellite-based navigation system [144]. The proposed
control system was designed through three mechanisms that allowed the aircraft to
detect and isolate the attacks to the aircraft navigation system. A detection and
defense technique using the Doppler/received signal strength and an FTC algorithm
were used in their work. A Kalman filter was used to fuse high-frequency inertial
sensor information with low-frequency GPS data. The results showed that their
proposed mechanism robustly detects and corrects faults generated by injection of
malicious data. However, the efficiency of this method for faults in the actuator is
still questionable because it has not been applied yet.

The ability of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) in estimation and identification
of nonlinear systems makes it a suitable candidate for FDI [8,120,158,159,170,171];
but, none of these researches have investigated the application of FDI in designing
active FTC systems. Application of ANN in active FTC design is limited to use
as a fault compensator which analytically compensates the actuator/sensor error
based on the observed error in the system [23, 25, 27, 28]. Chen et al. introduced
a neural FTC design for faults in the actuators of a three degree-of-freedom (DoF)
helicopter [23]. In their design, ANN observer was developed based on radial basis
function to observe the error in the system and compensate it in a backstepping
control structure. Similar approaches based on ANN observer have been applied to
different applications [25, 27, 28].
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In this chapter, we introduced a novel active FTC system design for an UAV.
The proposed active FTC design consists of an ANN-based FDI system, a nonlinear
dynamic inversion (NDI) based flight controller, and a new feedback structure which
compensates the occurred fault based on the information received from the FDI
system. The FDI system is designed based on the result of our previous work [159],
in which we demonstrated that updating ANN weights with extended Kalman Filter
(EKF) algorithm improves the accuracy and response time of ANN-based fault
detection system. The proposed control design is implemented and evaluated on
a six degree of freedom (DoF) model of an unmanned aircraft, WVU YF22. To
the best of our knowledge, the problem of designing a united framework for FTC
which uses FDI information has not been solved. Moreover, due to the complicated
dynamic of a six degree of DoF model of the aircraft, there is no report on using six
DoF model of aircraft in designing active FTC system. Thus, the main contributions
of this work can be summarized as 1) a novel nonlinear active FTC design for aircraft
actuators is developed , 2) the proposed design helps to detect and isolate abrupt
faults without the need of control reconfiguration which is a challenge for other FTC
designs, 3) the controller is designed based on the six-DoF nonlinear model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the nonlinear
dynamic equation of the UAV, while Section 3 illustrates the FDI design. In Section
4 the proposed FTC design is presented and the simulation results are provided in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results and the conclusion of this study.

4.2

UAV Nonlinear Dynamic

In this section, the nonlinear dynamic model of the aircraft is presented. Figure 4.1
shows the aircraft body coordination, attitude angles, and the actuators. Similar
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Figure 4.1: The aircraft coordinate system [2]

to other airplanes, the control inputs of the proposed system are deflections of the
aileron (δA ), elevator (δE ), and rudder (δR ).
The following equations illustrate the aircraft equations of motion [172]. Their aerodynamic coefficients can be found in [173]. The nonlinear six-DoF of motion for an
aircraft over a flat earth are [174]:

ṗ =

Ixz (Ix − Iy + Iz )pq
Iz Iaero + Ixz naero
r
+
2
2
Ix Iz − Ixz
Ix Iz − Ixz
2
I[Iz (Iy − Iz ) − Ixz
]qr
+
2
Ix Iz − Ixz

(4.1)

1
[maero + pr(Iz − Ix ) + Ixz (r2 − p2 )]
Iy

(4.2)

q̇ =


Ix (Ix − Iy ) + Ixz2
(Ix − Iy + Iz )Ixz
r+
p q
ṙ =
2
2
Ix Iz − Ixz
Ix Iz − Ixz
Ixz Iaero + Ixx naero
+
2
Ix Iz − Ixz


β̇ = p sin α − r cos α +

(4.3)

1
[mg sin γ sin µ]
mv
(4.4)

+

1
[Y cosβ − T sin β cos α]
mv
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α̇ = q − (p cos α + r sin α) tan β
1
[−L + mg cos γ cos µ]
mv cos β
1
+
[−T sinα]
mv cos β
1
g
µ̇ =
(p cos α + r sin α) − tan β cos µ cos γ
cos β
v
L + T sinα
+
[tan γ sin µ + tan β]
mv
Y
tan γ cos µ cos β
+
mv
1
γ̇ =
[L cos µ − mg cos γ − Y sin µ cos β]
mv
T
+
[sin µ sin β cos α + cos µ sin α]
mv
1
v̇ = [−D + Y sin β − mg sin γ + T cos β cos α]
m
+

(4.5)

(4.6)

(4.7)

(4.8)

Equations (4.1)-(4.3) describe p, q, and r, which are the roll, pitch, and yaw rates
about the body-fixed frame, respectively. laero , maero , and naero are aerodynamic
rolling, pitching and yawing moments, respectively, and Ix , Iy , Iz are the moments
of inertia about the x, y, and z axis, respectively. Ixz is the inertia moment about
the xz plane. Equations (4.4)-(4.6) describe α, β, and µ, which are the angle of
attack, sideslip angle, and the bank angle, respectively; T is the thrust, and L is the
lift. Equations (4.7) and (4.8) describe the flight path angle γ, and the indicated
air speed v.

4.3

FDI Design

Active FTC design needs an online FDI strategy to update the control system with
the information related to the occurred fault. Faults in the system do not have any
specific and predictable pattern. Therefore, detection of faults need an accurate
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detection strategy. The proposed FDI technique is a Neural Netwrok (NN)-based
detection design in which its learning weight are updated online through the EKF
algorithm. This FDI strategy is adopted due to its accurate and fast detection ability [159]. In the following, the proposed neural network adaptive structure (NNAS)
is presented.

4.3.1

NNAS

The proposed NNAS used for FDI is developed in this subsection. Faults in a system
may be nonlinear and unpredictable; hence, ANN can be a suitable candidate for
their estimation. Unlike the direct ANN modeling procedures that use an ANN
to simulate the system behavior [157, 158], the NNAS detects faults based on the
output of the nonlinear observer
x̂˙ = f (x̂(t)) + g(x̂(t))u(t) + M (t)

(4.9)

ŷ = h(x̂(t))

where x̂(t) is the state vector of the nonlinear observer and M (t) is the neural
network observer that is defined as [159]:
Mi (t) = Wi (t)σ (Vi (t)δi (t))

(4.10)

where Mi (t) is the ith vector of M (t) for i = 1, ..., n. Wi (t) and Vi (t) = [Vi,1 (t), ..., Vi,m+n (t)]
are the weights associate with the ith output of the NNAS at time t. Here, δi (t)
can be defined as δi (t) = [Mi (t − τ ), ..., Mi (t − mτ ), ei (t − τ ), ..., ei (t − nτ )]T . Here,
τ indicates the sampling period or the step size of the observer; ei (t) = yi (t) − ŷi (t),
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and σ(.) is a tanh activation function which is selected due to its gradient strength.
σ(x) = (1 − e−x )/(1 + e−x )

(4.11)

In terms of the ith element Mi (t) of M (t) for i=1,...,n, the NN observer can be
represented as
Mi (t) = Wi (t)σ(Zi (t))

(4.12)

where
Zi (t) =

m
X

Vi,j (t)Mi (t − jτ ) +

j=1

n
X

Vi,m+j (t)ei (t − jτ )

(4.13)

j=1

The input of the observer M (t) is recursively updated with the previous m samples
of the observer inputs for j = 1, 2, ..., m, and also previous n samples of the system
output error ei (t − jτ ) for j = 1, 2, ..., n. Here, m and n are chosen based on the
needed accuracy and training time in the system. Large values of m and n guaranty
the convergence of the training and the accuracy of the ANN; however, large values
of them may increase the computation time and add unnecessary delays due to
increasing the training duration [159]. Thus, to have a real-time and accurate fault
detection, m and n should be chosen based on the needed accuracy and the system
frequency response.

4.3.2

Neural network weight update law

In order to achieve real-time performance, the NN weights should be tuned effectively [160]. In this study an adaptive tuning algorithm based on EKF is introduced.
The EKF helps to update the NN weighting parameters online, so that fast convergence rate of the NN learning will be guaranteed. Through the updating process, if
we consider the ith element of NNAS, then the EKF updating parameters can be
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described by [159]:
θi (k) = [Wi (k), Vi,1 (k), ..., Vi,m+n (k)]T

(4.14)

where k is the kth sampling instant, and t = kτ . The parameters will be calculated
in each sampling time with the following rules [159].
θi (k) = θi (k − 1) + ηi Ki (k)[yi (k) − ŷi (k)]
Ki (k) = Pi (k)Hi (k)[Hi (k)T Pi (k)Hi (k) + Ri (k)]−1

(4.15)

Pi (k + 1) = Pi (k) − Ki (k)Hi (k)T Pi (k)
where ηi is the learning coefficient, Pi (k) is the covariance matrix of the state estimation error, Ki (k) is the Kalman gain, and Ri (k) is the covariance matrix of the
estimated noise, which is computed recursively by [161]:


Ri (k) = Ri (k − 1) + eTi (k)ei (k) − Ri (k − 1) /k

(4.16)

Here Hi (k) is the derivative of ei (k) with respect to θi (k). Based on the observer
input in Equation (4.10), Hi (k) can be calculated as follow:
Hi (k) =
(
=

4.3.3

∂ei (k)
|θi =θi (k−1)
∂θi

σ(Zi (k)),

θ i = Wi

Wi (k)Mi (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,j

Wi (k)ei (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,m+j

(4.17)

Actuator FDI design

Here, the design procedure of the proposed actuator FDI using NNAS will be explained. Aileron δa , elevator δe , and rudder δr are the three main actuators which
are used in control of the airplane attitude. Typical motion equations of the airplane
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angular rate with actuator faults can be described as
ẋ = f (x) + g(x)in u + F (t)
x = [p, q, r]T , f (x) = [fp , fq , fr ]T


0 Lδr 
 Lδa



gin (x) = 
 0 Mδe 0 


Nδa 0 Nδr

(4.18)

where F (t) is the fault which occurs in the actuators; Lδa , Lδr , Mδe , Nδa , Nδr are
rolling, pitching and yawing moments about the control input deflections. fp , fq
and fr can be derived from Equations (4.1-4.3) as
fp = Iz laero + Ixz naero + Ixz (Ix − Iy + Iz )pq
2
(Iz (Iy − Iz ) − Ixz
)qr
2
Iz Iz − Ixz
Ixz (r2 − p2 )
fq = maero + pr(Iz − Ix ) +
Iy

+

(4.19)

2
fr = Ixz laero + Ix naero + (Ix (Ix − Iy ) + Ixz
)pq

−

Ixz (Ix − Iy + Iz )qr
2
Ix Ixz − Ixz

Considering Equations (4.18) and (4.19), the FDI design for airplane actuators can
be presented by
û = g(x)−1
in (ẋ − f (x))

(4.20)

ũ = u − (û + Mi (t))
where û in Equation (4.20) represents the nonlinear observer model of the actuator,
ũ is the FDI error which is used as an NN input in δi (t), and Mi (t) which is updated
at each sample time can be described with the following equation.
X

m
Mi (k + 1) = Wi σ
Vi,j Mi (k − j + 1) + Bi (k)
j=1

where Bi (k) =

Pn

j=1

Vi,m+j ei (k − j + 1).
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(4.21)

4.4

Active FTC design

In this Section, the proposed active FTC design is presented. The proposed controller consists of two parts: 1) the nonlinear dynamic inversion (NDI) control, and
2) the adaptive fault compensation feedback controller.

4.4.1

Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion Controller

Nonlinear dynamic inversion (NDI) is one of feedback linearization techniques that
received a great deal of attention in flight control design [175–177]. This technique
which commonly consists of two control loops eliminates the need for gain scheduling by inversion and cancellation of the inherent dynamics and replacement of a set
of desired dynamics in each loop. In the proposed NDI design, two control loops
have been considered. This two-loop design requires the assumption of time scale
separation between the two loops, which means that the outer control loop should
have considerably lower bandwidth than that of the inner control loop to prevent
interaction between the loops [160, 175]. By separating state dynamics into two
groups, the faster state dynamics will be controlled by the inner loop and the slower
state dynamics will be controlled by the outer control loop.

4.4.1.1

Inner loop design

In the inner loop, faster states will be controlled. In the airplane model, these states
are the attitude rates p, q, r, which are getting controlled with actuators input δa ,
δe , and δr , and the desired values of the fast states come from the outer control loop.
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The fast attitude rate dynamics can be extracted from (4.1)-(4.3) as follows

  
 
ṗ fp (x)
δa 

  
 
q̇  = f (x) + gin (x) δ 
(4.22)
   q 
 e
  

 
ṙ
fr (x)
δr
where fp , fq , fr , and gin (x) are given in Equations (4.18) and (4.19). Then, the
inner loop controller yields:
 
  

δa 
ṗd  fp (x)
 
  

 = g −1 (x) q̇  − f (x)
u=
δ
in
e
d
q
 
  

 
  

δr
ṙd
fr (x)
where ṗd , q̇d , ṙd are the desired angular
  
ṗd  ωp
  
q̇  =  0
 d 
  
ṙd
0

rates which are defined as follows


0 0  pc − p




ωq 0 
  qc − q 


0 ωr
rc − r

(4.23)

(4.24)

where pc , qc , rc are the angular rates received from the outer loop controller, and
ωp , ωq , ωr are the inner loop gains which are selected by the designer to obtain the
desired performance. Choosing sufficiently large inner-loop gains will guarantee the
stability of gin (x) and its inverse matrix [162].
4.4.1.2

Outer loop controller

The outer loop controller is designed to control the slow states α, β, µ where the
inputs αc , βc , µc are the input commands from the guidance system and the outputs
pc , qc , rc are the reference commands for the inner-loop controller. The assumption
of the time scale separation between the inner loop and the outer loop controllers
ensures that the deflections of the control surfaces (δa , δe , δr ) have no interaction
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with the outer-loop states. Then, based on Equations (4.4)-(4.6), the outer loop
states yields




 
 
˙
 βd   f β 
p
   
 
α˙  = f  + gout (x) q 
 d  α
 
   
 
µ˙d
fµ
r
while the desired slow states are defined as
  
˙
 βd  ωβ 0
  
α˙  =  0 ω
α
 d 
  
µ˙d
0 0

follows


0   βc − β 




0
 αc − α


ωµ
µc − µ

(4.25)

(4.26)

where ωβ , ωα , ωµ are the outer-loop gains that are selected by the designer to achieve
the desired performance, and βc , αc , µc are the commands that are generated by the
guidance system. The outer-loop controller is derived using (4.25) as follows
 
   
˙
pc 
 βd  fβ 
 


  
−1 
q  = gout
  
α
˙
 c
 d  − fα 
 
   
rc
µ˙d
fµ

(4.27)

Stability of the matrix gout and its inverse can be also guaranteed by choosing large
enough outer-loop gains [162].

4.4.2

Adaptive Fault Compensation Feedback Controller

In this subsection, the FTC design is finalized. This controller consists of a two-loop
DI controller, an adaptive NN FDI structure, and a feedback signal to compensate
for the occurred fault in real time. The structure of the FTC design is as follows
  

 
ṗ fp (x)
δa 
  

 
q̇  = f (x) + gin (x) δ  + F (t) − M (t)
(4.28)
q
  

 e
  

 
ṙ
fr (x)
δr
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where the F (t) is the fault in the actuator, and M (t) is the NNAS detection signal
to compensate for the occurred fault in the system. Using Equation (4.28), the FTC
is derived as follows:


 
  
δa 
ṗd  fp (x)

 
  


−1
δ  = g (x) q̇  − f (x) + F (t) − M (t)
in
e
d
q
 
  


 
  


ṙd
fr (x)
δr

(4.29)

Figure 4.2 shows the proposed united framework of FTC and FDI. In this figure, the
FDI part is separated by dashed lines, the FTC is separated by dashed-dot lines.

Figure 4.2: The proposed united framework for fault detection and compensation
(active FTC) diagram for an aircraft.

4.5

Numerical Simulations

This section shows that fault in the actuators of an aircraft would degrade the control
performance of the aircraft and illustrates that the proposed design is able to detect
and isolate the fault and compensate for the effects of faults on the system performance. The numerical simulations are performed using MATLAB SIMULINK
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software and the proposed FTC is applied to a nonlinear model of WVU YF-22
aircraft [173]. To show the advantages of the proposed method, the results are compared with one of the recent ANN-based adaptive FTC design [178], and nonlinear
dynamic inversion (NDI) control technique described in the literature [179]. In the
simulation results, in Figs. (4.4-4.9), the ANN-based adaptive FTC in [178] and the
proposed method are abbreviated as adaptive FTC and active FTC, respectively. In
the following subsections, a triangular-shaped fault is inserted to the aileron, elevator, and rudder of the aircraft, respectively. This kind of faults in the actuators can
occur for various reasons, such as a fall in a supply voltage or the actuator current
(because they normally need a separated power supply), interruptions in communication between the actuator and control, noise effect on the actuator (environmental
noise like a magnetic field), floating actuator faults, denial of service for a period
of time due to processor speed and network bandwidth, etc. [5, 6]. These kinds
of faults can be compensated with a supervisory system by inserting an artificial
control signal on the faulty actuator. This artificial signal should be injected in a
way to remove the effect of fault on the actuator. In the simulation, actuators are
modeled using a batch least squares (BLS) technique [173]:
Gactuator (s) =

1
e−0.02s
1 + 0.0424s

(4.30)

where the actuator deflections are bounded through a saturation filter between ±900
[180]. This saturation filters any false data larger than the defined boundary in the
communication links and the rest will be compensated through the proposed resilient
controller. Finally, the control performance of the proposed design (active FTC) is
compared with the NDI controller [179], and the adaptive FTC system [23].
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Figure 4.3: Fault detection using NNAS.

4.5.1

Fault in the Aileron

A triangular fault is applied to the aileron. Figure 4.3 shows the injected (solid
line) and detected (dashed line) fault in the aileron actuator. As it can be seen in
the Figure, the proposed NNAS has successfully detected the fault in the actuator.
Figure 4.4 shows that the proposed FTC design can compensate for the fault effects
based on the detected fault and the aircraft is able to track the given commands
from the pilot/autopilot, while, the NDI and adaptive FTC controller performance
degraded in the presence of this fault. Figure 4.5 shows the deflections of the aircraft
actuators in the presence of the fault in the aileron for the proposed active FTC,
the adaptive FTC, and the NDI controller. By comparing the aileron deflections of
these three controllers, it can be clearly seen that the fault has a direct effect on
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Table 4.1: RMSE in the
Control Approach
Active FTC
Adaptive FTC [178]
NDI [179]

presence of a fault in aileron.
β
α
µ
0.0061 0.1036 0.0208
0.0956 17.58 2.0746
14.615 14.700 491.0362

the aileron for an amplitude of 55 degrees with the NDI control technique, while
it is successfully compensated using the proposed technique. The adaptive FTC
damped the fault in the aileron but had some harsh effects on the other actuators.
This harsh effect is due to the fact that the suggested ANN works based on the error
in the actuation system and tries to damp the error without considering the system
performance. From these figures, it can be also seen that fault in aileron has no
significant effect on the other actuators in the proposed active FTC, while this has
a significant impact on the other actuators using other techniques. This impact is
due to the fact that NDI and adaptive FTC controller try to make the system stable
using other actuators; however, according to Figure 4.4, the NDI and adaptive FTC
were not successful in tracking the desired attitude commands. In order to compare
the tracking error of the proposed controller with the adaptive FTC and the NDI
controller numerically, the root mean square error (RMSE) is calculated using the
following formula
r
RM SE =

2

2
ΣN
i=1 (Command − T racking)
N

(4.31)

The results are shown in Table.4.1. The numerical analysis results in Table. 4.1
clearly show that the proposed method has significant advantages in compensating
for the effect of the fault in the aircraft attitude tracking system.
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Figure 4.4: Attitude tracking control of the aircraft in presence of fault in the aileron
actuator.

4.5.2

Fault in the Elevator

In the second scenario, the triangular fault was also applied to the elevator, and
the NNAS was able to detect the applied fault accurately. Figure 4.6 shows that
the proposed active FTC controller successfully tracks the given commands in the
presence of the fault in the elevator. It should also be mentioned that the angle
of attack (α) control has a direct relationship to the elevator actuator. Figure
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Figure 4.5: Actuator deflections in the presence of a fault in the aileron actuator.

4.7 shows the actuators of the aircraft in the presence of faults in the elevator
for the proposed active FTC, adaptive FTC, and NDI controller, respectively. It
can be clearly seen that the fault has not disturbed the elevator actuation for the
system designed with the proposed active FTC, while fault interrupted the elevator
actuation in the NDI and the adaptive FTC. Moreover, it can be seen that FTC did
not deteriorate the healthy actuators, while the NDI controller and adaptive FTC
had a disruptive impact on the healthy actuators to keep the aircraft stable. Like
the previous subsection, to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed active FTC
numerically, the RMSE of tracking in the presence of a fault in the elevator is shown
in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: RMSE in the
Control Approach
Active FTC
Adaptive FTC [178]
NDI [179]

presence of
β
0.00004
0.0026
0.000343

a fault in the elevator.
α
µ
0.0922 0.000346
17.23 0.0282
2.4885 0.00036
- with Active FTC
- with Adaptive FTC
- with NDI
-c

#10 -3

2

degree

0
-2
-4
-6
0

5

10

15

20

25

time (sec)
, with Active FTC
, with Adaptive FTC
, with NDI
,c

30

degree

20
10
0
-10
0

5

10

15

20

25

time (sec)
0.01

degree

0
7 with Active FTC
7 with Adaptive FTC
7 with NDI
7

-0.01
-0.02

c

-0.03
-0.04
0

5

10

15

20

25

time (sec)

Figure 4.6: Attitude tracking control of the aircraft in presence of fault in the
elevator actuator.
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Figure 4.7: Actuator deflections in presence of fault in the elevator.

4.5.3

Fault in the Rudder

The third scenario investigates fault occurrence in the rudder and its effect on aircraft performance. Figure 4.8 shows that the proposed FTC design is not only able
to tolerate the fault in the rudder but also can keep the control performance in a desired condition. The results show that the NDI control technique and adaptive FTC
performances are degraded in the presence of fault in the rudder. Figure 4.9 shows
the actuator deflections of the aircraft in the presence of fault in the rudder. Due to
the fact that the rudder has direct relation with the side slip angle control and the
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Table 4.3: RMSE in
Control Approach
Active FTC
Adaptive FTC [178]
NDI [179]

presence
β
0.0201
0.0998
5.9077

of fault in
α
0.1036
17.5117
0.1090

rudder.
µ
0.0033
0.1430
11.35

desired side slip angle is zero, the rudder should try to keep its position in presence
of the inserted fault. As it can be seen in Figure 4.9, the proposed active FTC was
able to keep the rudder position in presence of large amount of fault (with the amplitude of one radian), while the NDI and the adaptive FTC were not able to control
the fault in the actuator. In addition, it can be seen that the applied fault does not
have any significant impact on the other actuators using the proposed active FTC,
while the NDI and adaptive FTC influenced the operation of other actuators to keep
the aircraft stable but they were not successful in tracking the reference attitudes.
To demonstrate the advantages of proposed active FTC numerically, the RMSE of
the tracking commanded attitudes from the pilot in presence of fault in the rudder
are calculated and presented in Table.4.3.

4.6

Conclusion

This chapter introduced a novel active FTC design for UAV systems. The proposed design consists of an ANN-based FDI system, a nonlinear dynamic inversion
(NDI) based flight controller, and a new feedback structure which compensated
the occurred fault based on the information received from the FDI system. Active
FTC design helped to detect and reduce the effect of faults in the actuators in
the real-time and eliminated the needs for reconfiguring the controller structure. A
six-DoF model of WVU YF-22 aircraft was used to evaluate the proposed FTC design through numerical simulation. The simulation result showed that the proposed
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Figure 4.8: Attitude tracking control of the aircraft in the presence of fault in the
rudder actuator.

strategy has significant tolerance against faults in the actuator and helps to keep the
control performance without any interruption in presence of faults in the actuator.
In this strategy, NNAS came to action when a fault happened in the actuators and
did not limit the controller performance; moreover, the accurate fault detection in
this design helped to avoid any significant interruption in presence of actuator faults
in the control performance.

77

deflection (degree)

Aileron with Active FTC
Aileron with Adaptive FTC
Aileron with NDI

5

0

-5
0

5

10

15

deflection (degree)

time (sec)

20

25

Elevator with Active FTC
Elevator with Adaptive FTC
Elevator with NDI

20
0
-20
-40
0

5

10

15

20

25

deflection (degree)

time (sec)
Rudder with Active FTC
Rudder with Adaptive FTC
Rudder with NDI

30
20
10
0
-10
0

5

10

15

20

time (sec)

Figure 4.9: Actuator deflections in presence of fault in the rudder.
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CHAPTER 5
A NEURAL NETWORK-BASED ACTIVE FAULT-TOLERANT
DESIGN FOR PRESSURE CONTROL IN PROTON EXCHANGE
MEMBRANE FUEL CELLS

5.1

Introduction

This chapter introduces a novel controller design for pressure control in proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cells. The proposed controller is able to control the
system under fault/failure of the actuators. The introduced design uses an artificial
neural network (ANN) for online fault detection and isolation (FDI) in the pressure
valves of the PEM fuel cell (PEMFC). A nonlinear controller based on feedback
linearization (FBL) technique is designed to compensate for the fault effects in real
time. The simulation results clearly show that the proposed active fault-tolerant
control (FTC) design can accurately detect, estimate and track the PEMFC actuators faults and failure, and compensate for their negative impacts while following
the desired control performances. The rest of this chapter investigates the importance of having a reliable controller in PEMFC system, the recent achievements in
the field of FTC design for PEMFC systems, and the main contributions of this
chapter.

Achieving a clean, reliable, and sustainable energy source is one of the urgent
needs, that has received a great deal of attention among the researchers in the past
several years. Among various approaches in energy production, proton exchange
membrane (PEM) fuel cell is a suitable candidate for both stationary and portable
applications. In the PEM fuel cells (PEMFCs) electricity and water are produced
through a chemical reaction between Oxygen and Hydrogen; therefore, it is con-
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sidered as a green and clean energy source. In this process, pressure control is not
only important in obtaining a reliable electricity production but also plays an important role in the PEMFC stack life [181–183]. An accurate control of air pressure
in PEMFC helps to prevent damages to the membranes that would increase the lifecycle of the PEMFC. Various control approaches have been applied to control the
PEMFC varied from linear [184] to nonlinear [185, 186] strategies. However, most
of the control strategies assume that all of the components in the system work perfectly. For this reason, they might not provide a satisfactory result in the presence of
faults and failures in the system components. Therefore, resiliency and robustness
of control system against faults and failures have received a great attention among
the control designers in the recent decades [183, 187–190].
Fault tolerant control (FTC) design deals with the control of the system in the
presence of faults in the system. These kinds of controllers are mainly divided into
two categories [191]: passive FTC [188, 192–194], and active FTC [23, 25, 27, 28, 187,
195–197]. Passive control strategies do not consider the size of fault or where it occurred. In other words, their performance does not rely on fault detection. Instead,
they use a fixed compensator or switching among a bank of predefined controllers
to reduce the effect of the potential faults in the system. For example, Bianchi et al.
introduced a passive FTC named unfalsified control (UC) for PEMFC [188]. Their
proposed UC consisted of a bank of controllers, and the falsified controller will be replaced by another remaining controller (unfalsified) from the bank of the controller.
However, there is no guarantee that the controllers in the bank can achieve the
desired performance in the presence of faults. Passive FTCs have been widely used
due to their simplicity and low computation load [188,192–194]; however, they have
three major drawbacks: (1) most of the passive FTCs use hardware redundancy to
tackle the fault problem which increases the cost and weight of the product; (2)
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they are susceptible to large faults; (3) the passive FTC design is commonly based
on some conservative restrictions that might limit the nominal performance of the
system. Therefore, most of the recent studies focused on the active FTC systems.

Active FTCs perform based on the received fault detection (FD) data and use
them to tackle the fault problem in the control system. Various FD and control
techniques have been used widely for PEMFC. However, there is still a need for
more research to have a united FD and FTC design.
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are an ideal mathematical tool to estimate the
system dynamics due to their nonlinear function estimation property and learning
ability. ANNs have been widely used for fault detection [187,198–200]. Kamal et al.
introduced a radial basis function (RBF) neural network to obtain faults in the actuators and sensors of the PEMFC system [198]. Their RBF-based neural network FD
design could detect faults up to 10% of the nominal value of the parameter. Wu et al.
used a backpropagation NN to simulate the normal behavior of the PEMFC system
and detect flooding by comparing the simulated data with the actual performance
of the PEMFC; then, based on the occurred fault, a reconfiguration mechanism decides which backup controller to be used [187]. In their later work, they introduce
an active FTC controller for a solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC) which switches among
the predefined optimal PID controllers based on the detected fault [195]. Their proposed controller worked well under predefined faults. However, the performance of
the controller under unknown faults was not investigated. A self-tuning PID controller with a neural-based fault detection was used to design an active FTC system
for water management of a PEMFC system [199]. The designed FTC system was
able to detect faults in the actuators. Despite the mentioned advantages of ANNs,
their heavy computation load for estimation of complex systems may make them
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inappropriate for real-time FD applications. Machine learning (ML) based algorithms have also been used for fault detection in the fuel cell system. In a recent
work, an ML-based approach based on support vector machine (SVM) learning was
introduced to diagnose a fault in an SOFC system [201]. Despite the acceptable
accuracy of ML-based approaches, the need for substantial training data and huge
computation load are two drawbacks that hindered the broad application of them
in fuel cell systems.

The model-based observer is another tool that can be applied for detection of
faults in the systems [202–204]. Rosich et al. introduced a nonlinear model-based
observer design for sensor fault detection in PEMFC system [202]. The modelbased observers are very dependent on the model accuracy, and a small deviation
from the model or uncertainties would lead to false fault alarm. Lira et al. used
a linear parameter varying (LPV) model of PEMFC to design a model-based FD
system [203]. They obtained the LPV model from linearizing the nonlinear model
around a set of operating points. A fault diagnosis strategy was introduced based
on modified super-twisting (ST) sliding mode control technique for PEMFCs system
by Liu et al. [204]. Their proposed FD system consisted of two linear and two nonlinear terms to estimate states and detect fault signals. A fault scenario, i.e., sudden
air-leak in air supply manifold was considered, and their proposed FD system could
detect faults with sufficient accuracy. Davoodi et al. introduced a linear matrix inequality approach to detect faults and control them in a linear time-invariant (LTI)
model [205]. As it mentioned before, the model-based observers are sensitive to
the model accuracy where LPV and LTI models are not sufficiently accurate to be
applied for detection of faults in a highly nonlinear plant like PEMFC air-feed model.
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To tackle the problem of inaccuracy in the model-based observer and the computational load in ANN, a combination of these two methods was suggested to estimate
the unmodeled and uncertain dynamics of the system and reduce the computation
load by using the model-based observer data [?, 129, 159]. Talebi et al. introduced
an integrated recurrent ANN nonlinear observer to design an FD system for sensor
and actuator faults in a satellite [129]. Abbaspour et al. introduced an extended
Kalman filter (EKF) approach to improve the accuracy and speed response of the
ANN observer in fault detection and isolation in nonlinear systems. However, the
works in [129, 159] did not propose any solution for fault compensation. ANN has
been widely used for fault compensation [23,25,27,28,197]; however, neither of these
works did locate and isolate the fault in the system, and they used the ANN observer to compensate the actuation error in the system analytically. This kind of
fault compensation does not identify the fault location and cannot be used for further supervision procedures, e.g., control reconfiguration or actuator replacement.
Moreover, in case of failure in the actuator, they cannot keep the system performance
in the desired condition, which motivates the present research work.
In this chapter, a unified framework for the detection of faults/failures and compensation of its effect in PEMFC system is proposed. The proposed FD system
gives us the fault/failure data and location which is used to design an active FTC
for nonlinear model of PEMFC system. The proposed active FTC design consists
of a feedback linearization (FBL) controller, an ANN-based FD feedback structure
that can reduce the fault effect in the actuators by compensating for the detected
fault in the actuator system, and a fault analyzer algorithm which is developed to
use the redundant actuator in case of actuator failure. To the best of my knowledge,
the problem of designing an active FTC controller for nonlinear systems which can
detect the fault and failure, and compensate for it in real-time has not been solved
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for PEMFC system. The proposed active FTC design is implemented and evaluated on a nonlinear model of the PEMFC system. The simulation results show that
the proposed active FTC system has successfully detected the fault/failure in the
actuator and reduced its effect on the system in real time. The main contributions
in this chapter can be summarized as 1) a novel active FTC design for nonlinear
systems to compensate faults and failures without the need of control reconfiguration is designed for the first time, 2) the FD system and the active FTC controller
are designed based on the nonlinear model of the PEMFC which increases the accuracy of the proposed design. 3) the proposed design can detect and compensate
for simultaneous faults and failures in real-time.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the nonlinear
dynamic model of PEMFC. In Section 3, the proposed FD system is presented. In
Section 4, the design procedures of the proposed active FTC design for PEMFC
system is illustrated. The simulation results of our proposed active FTC design are
provided in Section 5. Finally, the concluding remarks are brought in Section 6.

5.2

PEMFC MODEL

This section presents the dynamic model of the PEMFC [181], which will be used
for designing the active FTC system. The anode equations are described as:
RT
Va



uH2 ka YH2 λH2 − C1 If c


− uH2 ka λH2 − C1 If c FH2

ṖH2 =



uH2 ka λH2 PH +PφHa POvs−φa Pvs
2
2 a


− uH2 ka λH2 − C2 If c FH2 Oa − C2 If c

ṖH2 Oa =

RT
Va

(5.1)
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(5.2)

and the equations of the cathode side are


uO2 kc YO2 λO2 − C21 If c


C1
− uO2 kc YN2 λO2 − 2 If c FO2

ṖO2 =

RT
Vc

(5.3)


RT 
uO2 kc YN2 λO2 − uO2 kc λO2 FN2
Vc

φc Pvs
uO2 kc λO2 PO +PN +P
ṖH2 Oc = RT
+ C1 If c
Vc
H2 Oc −φc Pvs
2
2


− uO2 kc λO2 + C1 If c + C2 If c FH2 Oc + C2 If c
ṖN2 =

(5.4)

(5.5)

where the anode and cathode variables are denoted by subscript of ’a’ and ’c’ ,
respectively. uH2 and uO2 are the input control variables, which are the flow rates
of Hydrogen and Oxygen gases, respectively; ka and kc are the conversion factors;
YO2 , YH2 , and YN2 are the initial mole fractions of Oxygen, Hydrogen and Nitrogen
which are set as 0.21, 0.99, and 0.79, respectively; λH2 is the ratio of the Hydrogen
supplied to the anode side, φa and φc are the humidity on the anode side and cathode
side, respectively; If c is the current density of the fuel cell; Pvs is the pressure of
the saturation; FO2 , FH2 , FN2 , FH2 Oa , FH2 Oc , C1 and C2 are some defined factors to
simplify the representation of the dynamic model equations and they are
F O2 =
FN2 =
FH2 Oc =

PO2
,
PO2 +PN2 +PH2 Oc

PN2
,
PO2 +PN2 +PH2 Oc

PH2 Oc
,
PO2 +PN2 +PH2 Oc

F H2 =

PH2
PH2 +PH2 Oa

FH2 Oa =

C1 =

N Af c
,
2F

PH2 Oa
PH2 +PH2 Oa

(5.6)

C2 = 2.5368C1

where F is the Faraday constant.
The following MIMO nonlinear system with disturbances is constructed to obtain
an affine model to control the Oxygen and Hydrogen pressure in the PEMFC [206]:
ẋ = f (x) + g1 (x)uH2 + g2 (x)uO2 + p(x)d
T

T

T

y = [y1 , y2 ] = [PH2 , PO2 ] = [h1 (x), h2 (x)]
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(5.7)
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(5.8)

As it can be seen in Equation (5.7), the input-output behavior of the system is
nonlinear and coupled. Considering Equation (5.7), the PEMFC dynamic model
with faults in the actuator can be described as follows:
ẋ = f (x) + g1 (x)uH2 + g2 (x)uO2 + p(x)d + F (x, t)

(5.9)

where F (x, t) is the fault in the PEMFC actuators. Figure 5.1 shows the overall
structure of a PEMFC with its air pressure control unit.
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Figure 5.1: The diagram of the operation and air pressure control of the PEMFC.

5.3

FD Design

A new design for actuator fault detection (FD) in PEMFC is introduced in this
section. The proposed FD system is designed based on a nonlinear observer and
a neural network adaptive structure (NNAS). The proposed NNAS is described as
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follows
Mi (t) = Wi (t)σ (Vi (t)δi (t))

(5.10)

whereM (t) is the output of neural network observer and the subscript i denotes
the ith vector of M (t) for i = 1, ..., n. Wi (t) and Vi (t) = [Vi,1 (t), ..., Vi,m+n (t)] are
the weights associate with the ith output of the NNAS at time t. Here, δi (t) can
be defined as δi (t) = [Mi (t − τ ), ..., Mi (t − mτ ), ei (t − τ ), ..., ei (t − nτ )]T . Here, τ
indicates the sampling period or the step size of the observer; ei (t) = yi (t) − ŷi (t),
and σ(•) is the sigmoid activation function in the form of σ = (1 − e−x )/(1 + e−x ).
In terms of the ith element Mi (t) of M (t) for i = 1, ..., n, the ANN observer can be
represented as
Mi (t) = Wi (t)σ(Zi (t))

(5.11)

where
Zi (t) =

m
X

Vi,j (t)Mi (t − jτ ) +

j=1

n
X

Vi,m+j (t)ei (t − jτ )

(5.12)

j=1

The input of the observer M (t) is recursively updated with the previous m samples
of the observer inputs for j = 1, 2, ..., m, and also previous n samples of the system
output error ei (t − jτ ) for j = 1, 2, ..., n. Here, m and n are chosen based on
the needed speed response in the system. Large values of m and n guaranty the
convergence of the training; however, they may increase the computation time and
add unnecessary delays [159].

5.3.1

ANN Weight Update Law

It is well known that online tuning of ANN weights helps to improve the response
speed of the ANN detection [159]. In this paper, an EKF is used for online updating
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of the ANN gains. The EKF updating parameter can be described by [159]:
θi (k) = [Wi (k), Vi,1 (k), ..., Vi,m+n (k)]T

(5.13)

where k is the kth sampling instant, and t = kτ . The Kalman gain and the updating
rules can be defined as follows [159]
θi (k) = θi (k − 1) + ηKi (k)[yi (k) − ŷi (k)]
Ki (k) = Pi (k)Hi (k)[Hi (k)T Pi (k)Hi (k) + Ri (k)]−1

(5.14)

Pi (k + 1) = Pi (k) − Ki (k)Hi (k)T Pi (k)
where η is the learning coefficient, Pi (k) is the covariance matrix of the state estimation error, Ki (k) is the Kalman gain, and Ri (k) is the covariance matrix of the
estimated noise which is computed recursively by [159]:


Ri (k) = Ri (k − 1) + eTi (k)ei (k) − Ri (k − 1) /k

(5.15)

And Hi (k) is the derivative of ei (k) with respect to θi . Based on the observer input
in (5.13), Hi (k) can be calculated as follow:
Hi (k) =
σ(Zi (k)),

θ i = Wi

Wi (k)Mi (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,j

Wi (k)ei (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,m+j

(
=

∂ei (k)
|θi =θi (k−1)
∂θi
(5.16)

Since Mi (t) is updated at each sample time, its updating process can be described
with the following equation:
Mi (k + 1) = Wi σ

X
m


Vi,j Mi (k − j + 1) + Bi (k)

(5.17)

j=1

where Bi (k) =

Pn

j=1

Vi,m+j ei (k − j + 1). The prove of the stability of EKF updating

can be found in our previous work [159].
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5.3.2

Actuator FD design for PEMFC

In this subsection, the nonlinear observer design for the actuators of the PEMFC
system will be illustrated, then, application of of this observer for the proposed
actuator FD in a PEMFC system will be explained. In this study, faults in the
pressure valve of the actuators of the PEMFC are considered. There are two main
actuators in the air pressure control of the PEMFC: uH2 and uO2 are electronic
valves for regulating Hydrogen and Oxygen gas pressure in the PEMFC.
Considering Equation (5.7) and f (x) = 0 in (5.8), the control law u can be extracted
as follows

u = G−1 (x) v − p(x)d

(5.18)

where v = [ẏ1 , ẏ2 ]T , G(x) is the decoupling matrix. The matrix G(x) is exponentially
stable for large enough gain in the controller design [162]. The control variable u
showed up after the first derivative of y1 = PH2 and y2 = PO2 , so the relative degree

90

vector [r1 r2 ] is [1 1], and G(x) can be defined as


Lg1 h1 (x) Lg2 h1 (x)
G(x) = 

Lg1 h2 (x) Lg2 h2 (x)


RT λH2
0
 V (ka YH2 − ka FH2 )

= a

RT λO2
0
(k
)Y
−
k
Y
F
c O2
c N2 O2
Vc


 
uH2 
y1 
u=
 , y =   , d = If c ,
uO2
y2


C1
Va

− 1 + FH2





p(x) = RT 
 C1 (−1 +
 2Vc




(5.19)








PH2 Oa

)
PO2 +PN2 +PH2 Oc 


where Lg1 and Lg2 are the Lie derivative of g1 and g2 , respectively. Considering
(5.18), the FD system for PEMFC can be designed as follows
û = G−1 (x) v − p(x)d

ũ = u − û + M (t)


(5.20)

where û is the output of the nonlinear observer of the actuator that can be obtained
by substituting p(x) and G(x) in (5.19) into (5.20), M (t) is the NNAS output, and
ũ is the FD error which is the input to the ANN.

5.4

Active FTC Design

In this section, the proposed active FTC system design is illustrated. The active
nonlinear FTC controller which is designed based on FBL technique, received data
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from the FD system, and a fault analyzer block is illustrated in the following subsections.

5.4.1

FBL Controller

FBL controller is one of the most common and efficient nonlinear control strategies
used in the field of PEMFC control [181]. This control technique uses feedback
signal to cancel the inherent nonlinear dynamic in the system and eliminates the
common needs of gain scheduling in comparison with the linear control strategies.
Considering (5.9-5.19), the nonlinear control law for Hydrogen and Oxygen pressure
control in PEMFC can be derived as




ṖH2D 
u = G−1 (x) 
 − p(x)d
ṖO2D

(5.21)

where ṖH2D and ṖO2D are the derivatives of the desired value of Hydrogen and
Oxygen pressure that can be obtained using a linear stabilizer controller, i.e., a
proportional-integral (PI) controller [181].

5.4.2

FTC Design

The FTC design introduced in this paper consists of a nonlinear FBL controller
and the online NNAS fault detection system. Here, we illustrate how to link the
nonlinear controllers and the NNAS fault detection system.
Considering the nonlinear FBL control law in (5.21), the actuator fault in (5.9), and
the detected fault in (5.11), the nonlinear FTC law to compensate for the occurred
fault in the real time can be written as



ṖH2D 

u = G−1 (x) 
 − p(x)d − M (t)
ṖO2D
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(5.22)

where M (t) is the output of the NNAS which is the detected fault using online FD
system.

5.4.3

Fault Analyzer

In order to guarantee the system performance from severe faults/failure that cannot
be tackled by analytical redundancy, we introduced a fault analyzer (FA) block to
our controller to put a redundant actuators in the control loop. In the FA block, 0.2
second time is given to the analytical redundancy to fix the problem and if it cannot
fix the fault/failure problem, the redundant actuator will be in the control loop to fix
it. Algorithm 1 is designed for fault analyzing. In the algorithm, an actuator failure
is considered as a situation that the fault is not fixed after 0.2 second analytical fault
compensation and there still 0.1 per unit (pu) fault in the system. Figure 5.2 shows
the block diagram of the proposed FTC system and the stability of the proposed
design is investigated in the following subsection.
while kM (t) − u(t)k > 0.1pu do
tf =tf + 0.01;
if tf > 0.2 then
Switch on redundant actuator;
else
Do not involve the redundant actuator;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Fault Analyzer Algorithm.

5.5

Numerical Simulation

Numerical simulations have been performed to examine the performance of the proposed control strategy in the presence of fault and failure in the PEMFC actuators.
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Figure 5.2: Block diagram of the proposed active FTC controller for PEMFC.

For simplicity, we will not considered the fuel processor, air compressor model, and
water management. The PEMFC model parameters used in this paper are based
on fuel cell system Ballard MK5-E-based PGS105B and can be found in [181]. To
validate the behavior of the dynamic model, the simulation results of the model
behavior were compared with the results in [207]. The PEMFC stack used in our
simulation has totally 35 series connected cells, and the area of each cell is 232 cm2 .
The purpose of the designed controller is to regulate the Hydrogen and Oxygen
pressure to 3 atmosphere in the PEMFC stack. The temperature of the stack at
the air outlet is kept between 72◦ C and 75◦ C to maximize the output power. The
simulations are done with MATLAB SIMULINK on a core i7 desktop computer.
In the proposed active FTC system, the initial values of the NNAS parameters are
selected as follows: P0 =15×eye(3), θ0 = [2, 2, 2]T , R0 = 2 × 10−5 , K = 1, and
y0 = 0.1. These values are selected based on the system performance and the designer objectives. The load profile connected to the PEMFC is shown in Fig. 5.3.
Two scenarios have been considered in the simulations: 1 ) Fault in the actuator, 2 )
Simultaneous actuator faults and failure.
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5.5.1

Fault in the actuator

In this scenario, a step fault which is shown in Fig.5.4 is inserted into the PEMFC
actuators, i.e., Hydrogen and Oxygen pressure valves. To show the advantages of
the proposed method, its performance is compared with that of the simple FBL
controller [181] and the result is illustrated in the following.
Figure 5.4 shows that the designed FD system can successfully detect the fault in
the PEMFC actuators. As it can be seen, there are some small overshoots at the
beginning of the fault detection process that are eliminated by training of the ANN
after a portion of a second. This kind of fault can occur for various reasons, e.g.,
severe vibrations, metal flakes, actuator inaccuracy, improper connection of electrical
wires to the actuators, etc. [159]. This detection of a fault in the PEMFC actuators
helps the controller to reduce the fault effect on the system performance which can
be seen in Figs. 5.5 and 5.6.

Figure 5.5 shows the performance of the pressure

valves of the PEMFC stands along fault effects, which compares the proposed FTC
with the FBL controller in damping the fault effect. This figure shows that the
proposed strategy successfully reduces the fault effect in the Hydrogen and Oxygen
pressure valves, while the FBL controller is unable to damp the inserted fault in the
actuators. Figure 5.6 shows the fault effect on the performance of the controller in
controlling the air pressure. In this figure, it can be seen that in the proposed active
FTC, the fault cannot deteriorate the control performance and the pressure of the
PEMFC can track the desired value (3 atm). The comparison of the performance
between FTC and FBL controller in Fig. 5.6 demonstrates that the FBL controller
is not effective in reduction of the fault effect in the system and its performance will
be degraded severely in the presence of a fault in the actuators. The fault tolerance
ability of the system is demonstrated in Figs. 5.5-5.8 and this ability helps to
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Figure 5.3: The load profile of connected to the PEMFC.
have stable and reliable energy production. Moreover, accurate pressure control in
PEMFC prevents membrane damages and subsequently increases the lifetime of the
PEMFC system [181].

5.5.2

Simultaneous Actuator Faults and Failure

In the second scenario, we examined the proposed control system performance
against a simultaneous fault and failure on Hydrogen pressure valves. This kind
of faults and failure can happen when the system has actuator malfunction, and at
the same time, some faults or false data is injected into the control structure. The
goal of this scenario is to test the system performance against one of the worst incidents that can happen to a PEMFC system. The step fault in Fig. 5.4 is repeated
in this scenario, and a short circuit failure in the Hydrogen pressure valve occurs
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Figure 5.4: Fault detection in actuators of PEMFC.
between the second 8 to the end of the simulation. Figs. 5.7 and 5.8 compare the
performance of the proposed controller with the FBL controller. As it can be seen
in Fig. 5.7, the pressure valve in FBL controller is directly affected by the fault
and at the second 6 by the short circuit failure while the FTC system switches to
the redundant actuator and the false data in the feedback system are compensated
through FD system. Fig. 5.8 shows that FTC can keep the desired pressure in the
presence of faults and failure while the FBL lost its stability.
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Figure 5.5: Fault effect on the actuators.

5.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, a novel active FTC design is introduced to control the gas pressures
in the PEMFC in the presence of faults in the actuators. The simulation results
showed that the proposed control design is able to detect and reduce the effect of
faults in the actuator in real time. This tolerance against faults helps to maintain
the PEMFC gas pressure at the desired values, keeping the PEMFC in a desirable
condition and subsequently lengthen its lifetime. In order to demonstrate the advantages of our proposed active FTC system, the results were compared with the FBL
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Figure 5.6: Pressure control in the presence of a fault in the actuators.
control system. The outcome of the simulation showed the significant advantage of
the proposed design in the presence of faults in the actuators.
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Figure 5.7: Fault effect on the actuators.
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Figure 5.8: Pressure control in the presence of a fault in the actuators.
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CHAPTER 6
RESILIENT CONTROL DESIGN FOR LOAD FREQUENCY
CONTROL OF POWER GRID SYSTEM UNDER FALSE DATA
INJECTION ATTACKS

6.1

Introduction

The power grid is identified as one of the critical infrastructures for our nation.
Smart power grids are being enhanced by adding communication infrastructure to
improve their reliability, sustainability, and efficiency. Despite all of these great
advantages, these open communication architecture and connectivity renders the
power systems’ vulnerability to a range of cyber attacks. This chapter proposes
a novel active resilient control system for distributed power systems (DPSs) under
false data injection (FDI) attacks. The proposed system is able to jointly detect
and mitigate FDI attacks on nonlinear power systems. The design works based on a
new anomaly detection (AD) technique which consists of a Luenberger observer and
an artificial neural network (ANN). Since FDI attacks can happen rapidly, the observer structure is enhanced by Extended Kalman filter (EKF) to improve the ANN
ability for the online detection and estimation. The resilient controller is designed
based on the attack estimation, which can eliminate the need for control reconfiguration. The resiliency of the proposed design against FDI attacks is tested on a
Load Frequency Control (LFC) system. The simulation results clearly show that
the proposed active resilient control system can successfully detect anomalies and
compensate for their negative effects. In the rest of this section, a brief introduction
of the AD approaches in power systems, the importance of FDI attack detection,
and our main contributions are discussed.
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Anomalies can cause destructive effects on the control system performance by
disturbing the integrity of sensor data. These anomalies can occur due to malicious cyber-attacks, faults, and failures in the system components. FDI attack, a
type of cyber-attack that aims the integrity of data, is emerging as a serious threat
to smart grid systems, which can degrade the system performance or endanger its
stability [5,8,135,190]. Faults and failures in the system components are also threatening the system performance and stability, and can occur at any moment due to
various reasons such as metal flakes, severe vibrations, short circuits, overloads, malicious attempts, etc [159, 208].
Even small FDI attacks can cause a major problem in the power system and can
disturb the lives of consumers, government corporations and businesses if they are
not timely diagnosed and tackled [209]. Thus, an accurate anomaly detection (AD)
and a resilient control strategy are needed to detect and keep the system reliable.
An adversary can inject FDI attacks to power grid network. Attacking one node can
affect the other nodes by redistributing the load to them, which can cause cascade
overload and consequently failure in the interconnected network [210]. A major
cyber-attack can be as devastating as the North-eastern blackout which occurred
in August 2003. This Incident was one example of the cascade failure in the power
grids and clearly shows that our power grids are vulnerable. Therefore, there is a
need for the resilient and intelligent controller to prevent such incidents [210].
The role of load frequency control (LFC), in a smart grid, is to keep the desired
frequency and power interchanges at the desired level [211]. Resiliency in an LFC
system improves the reliability of the power grid system. The very first step in
designing an LFC system resilient to anomalies in data integrity is to develop an
accurate AD system. The detection algorithm should be able to provide information
on size, location and time of the intrusion in real-time [52].
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In FDI attacks, false data are injected maliciously to the original data to damage
the system operation or breaking the communication between the system components [212]. In [213], the effects of an FDI attack on a smart grid system was
investigated. A hardware platform was introduced in [214], to examine the impact
of FDI attacks on microgrid performance index, i.e., the total load lost, the frequency nadir, and the time needed to reach frequency stability.

In this work, sensor spoofing is considered as the main scenario of the FDI attack. Sensor spoofing can be defined as injecting false data to the sensors of the
system in a way that are not detectable by the bad data detection algorithms [215].
Thus, a second defending mechanism is needed to keep the system secure.
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) in smart grids is one of the potential gates that
the attacker can inject malicious data into the system through sensor spoofing. In
PMUs, the global positioning system (GPS) is used for sub-station clock synchronization. Thus, by mimicking the GPS signal, the attacker can alter the GPS time
estimation in the PMU [215, 216]. These induced errors in time estimation will lead
to wrong phase angle measurement in the PMU. The role of PMU in the LFC system
is the acquisition of time-synchronized measurements of its state variables. PMUs
are able to process the synchronized measurements of the states of the LFC system
at a rate up to 120 samples/second which makes them superior to conventional sensors of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [217].

An accurate AD mechanism is necessary to report/monitor faults, failures, and
FDI attacks in real time. Numerous studies have been done for the detection
of anomalies and FDI attacks in power systems using different techniques. In
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general, they can be classified into two approaches: 1) model based approaches
[9, 10, 52, 218, 219], and 2) learning based approaches [220–226].

In model-based approaches, an observer based on the model dynamics is used
to estimate system dynamics, e.g., sliding mode observer (SMO) [9], Kalman filter [52, 218], weighted least square (WLS) observer [10], and principal component
analysis (PCA) [219, 227]. An SMO-based detection approach was introduced by
Ao et al. to detect FDI attacks in power system [9]. In their design, two sliding
mode observer were used, one for attacks on the state estimation, and the other
one for attacks on the sensor measurements. An FDI detection framework based on
the Kalman filter and χ2 observer was introduced by Mandhar et al. [52]. In their
design, Kalman filter estimates the grid states and χ2 trigger the alarm in case of
an intrusion. Deng et al. introduced a WLS-based FDI attack-detection framework
where the WLS observers were used to construct the residuals, and the residuals
were compared with the predefined threshold to judge whether any attacks occurred
or not [10]. In [219] and [227], PCA was used to ensure the integrity of the data
in state estimation of the power grid by filtering of faulty measurements. Despite
the advantages of model-based approaches in real-time anomaly detection and low
computation, their pure dependency on a mathematical model of the system makes
them vulnerable to model uncertainties and disturbances.

Learning-based approaches include methods that use artificial intelligence for
observing system states, e.g., artificial neural networks (ANN) [220–222], machine
learning approaches [223–226]. The property of nonlinear function estimation and
the learning ability of the ANNs make them ideal mathematical tools for dynamic
system estimation. However, their heavy computation load for state estimation of
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complex systems may make them inappropriate for real-time AD applications. Machine learning approaches also suffer from the same problem; moreover, they need
substantial training data for different FDI attack scenarios.

Most of the researches mentioned above have focused on the detection and estimation of FDI attacks in power systems. However, none of them can detect and
compensate FDI attacks automatically in the real time. Furthermore, most of the
model-based estimation techniques for FDI attack detections relies on an accurate
model of power systems and ignore the system uncertainties, nonlinearities, and
noises. In this work, to tackle the problem of inaccuracy in the model-based observer and the computational load in ANN, we proposed a novel design based on
their combination to estimate the unmodeled and uncertain dynamics of the system. Furthermore, the proposed technique reduces the computation load by using
the model-based observer data. A Luenberger observer is designed based on the
system dynamics and combined with a three layer feed-forward ANN to make it
robust against model uncertainties. The ANN learning weights are updated by an
extended Kalman filter (EKF) to improve its learning ability and reduce response
time. Then, a resilient control system is devised to compensate for the occurred
FDI attacks by using the information obtained by the detection algorithm. The
stability of the proposed control design is mathematically proven using Lyapunov
theory, and its advantages against FDI attacks are demonstrated through numerical
simulations. The contributions of this chapter are: 1) designing a novel resilient
control strategy to jointly detect and mitigate FDI attacks in real time for nonlinear
power systems, 2) introducing a united framework for detection and control of LFC
systems, 3) eliminating the need for control reconfiguration in presence of anomalies
in the LFC system. 4) proving the stability of the proposed controller for the power
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system under attacks.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 illustrates the dynamic model of LFC system. Section 6.3 presents the design procedure of the proposed AD system while Section 6.4 illustrates the design strategy for the proposed
resilient control system. Section 6.5 presents the simulation results of the proposed
resilient system and investigates the results for different scenarios. Finally, Section
6.6 discusses the results and the conclusions of this chapter

6.2

LFC Model

The mathematical model of an interconnected multi-area power system is briefly
described in this section. Each power area transmits sensor measurements to a centralized load frequency controller (LFC) to generate the appropriate control signals.
The detail description of the model can be found in [5].



Ẋ(t) = AX(t) + BU (t) + D∆P + d(t)
l

(6.1)



Y (t) = CX(t)
where X(t) , [X1 (t)T X2 (t)T · · · XN (t)T ]T ∈ Rm+N and U (t) ∈ Rn+N are the state
and input vectors, respectively. The d(t) is a bounded disturbance. The ∆Pl is the
load deviation. N is the number of interconnected power areas and C is an identity
matrix with appropriate dimensions. The states of the ith power area are defined
as Xi = [xi,1 (t)T , xi,2 (t)T , xi,3 (t)T , xi,4 (t)T , xi,5 (t)T ]T where xi,1 , xi,2 , xi,3 , xi,4 and xi,5
are frequency deviation ∆f i , generator power deviation ∆Pgi , turbine valve position
i
i
∆Ptu
, power flow of the tie-line ∆Ppf
and control error ei , respectively. The power

area control error is
i

Z

e (t) =

t

β i ∆f i dt

0
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(6.2)

where β i is the frequency bias factor.
The A, B, C and D are constant matrices and can be defined as


A
A
·
·
·
A
1,2
1,N
 1,1



 A2,1 A2,2 · · · A2,N 


A= .

.
.
.
 ..

.
.
.
.
.
.




AN,1 AN,2 · · · AN,N

(6.3)

T


B = diag{ B1T B2T · · ·

T
BN


D = diag{ D1T D2T · · ·

T
DN

}

(6.4)

}

(6.5)

T

where the matrix Bi and Di , Ai,i and Ai,j for i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N can be determined
as follows
T
1
0 0
Bi = 0 0
Tg,i

T
−1
Di =
0 0 0 0
Ji




−µi
Ji




0



−1
Ai,i = 


ωi Tg,i
P
 2
 i=j,j=1 2πTi,j

βi

0


 0


Ai,j = 
 0


−2πTi,j

0
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1
Ji
−1
Ttu,i

0
1

0

Ttu,i
−1
Tg,i

0

0

0

0

0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0


0


0


0



0

0

(6.6)
(6.7)

−1
0
Ji


0 0



0 0


0 0


0 1

(6.8)

(6.9)

where Ti,j is the stiffness constant between the ith and j th power areas. Ji , ωi , µi ,
Tg,i , and Ttu,i are the ith power area’s moment of inertia of generator, the speeddroop coefficient, damping coefficient, the governor time constant, and turbine time
constant.

6.3

Anomaly Detection

In this section, the proposed AD along with the resilient control structure are illustrated. The proposed AD system is able to detect anomalies in real time and
consists of an ANN observer and a Luenberger observer that are explained in details
in the following subsections.

6.3.1

ANN observer

Due to the fact that FDI attacks have no fixed pattern, and can be extremely
nonlinear and unpredictable, an ANN is a suitable candidate for estimation of their
behavior. The proposed anomaly observer, which consists of a Luenberger observer
and an ANN, can be described by
˙
X̂ = AX̂(t) + Bu(t) + L(y − ŷ)

(6.10)

ŷ = C X̂(t) + Os (t)

where X̂ is the state vector of the Luenberger observer, L is the Luenberger gain,
and Os (t) is the ANN observer that defines as [159]:
Osi (t) = Wi (t)σ (Vi (t)δi (t))

(6.11)

where Osi (t) is the ith vector of Os (t) for i = 1, ..., n. Wi (t) and Vi (t) = [Vi,1 (t), ..., Vi,a+b (t)]
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are the weights associate with the ith output of the ANN at time t. Here, δi (t) can
be defined as δi (t) = [Osi (t − τ ), ..., Osi (t − aτ ), ei (t − τ ), ..., ei (t − bτ )]T . where τ
indicates the sampling period or the step size of the observer; ei (t) = yi (t) − ŷi (t),
and σ(.) is a tanh activation function:
σ(x) = (1 − e−x )/(1 + e−x )

(6.12)

In terms of the ith element Osi (t) of Os (t) for i = 1, ..., b, the NN observer can be
represented as
Osi (t) = Wi (t)σ(Zi (t))

(6.13)

where
Zi (t) =

a
X

Vi,j (t)Osi (t − jτ ) +

b
X

Vi,a+j (t)ei (t − jτ )

(6.14)

j=1

j=1

The input of the observer Os (t) is recursively updated with the previous a samples
of the observer inputs for j = 1, 2, ..., a, and also previous b samples of the system
output error ei (t − jτ ) for j = 1, 2, ..., b. Here, a and b are chosen based on the
needed accuracy and training time in the system. Large values of a and b guaranty
the convergence of the training and the accuracy of the ANN; however, large values of
them may increase the computation time and add unnecessary delays by increasing
the training duration [159]. Furthermore, this is not helpful in case on non-periodic
FDI attacks. Thus, to have a real-time and accurate anomaly detection, a and b
should be chosen based on the needed accuracy and the system frequency response.

6.3.2

ANN update law

An active resilent LFC system needs a real-time anomaly detection performance, to
this aim, ANN weights should be updated in a fast rate [160, 171]. In this study, we
introduced an adaptive tuning algorithm based on EKF. The proposed algorithm
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helps online updating of the ANN learning weights based on the EKF algorithm
and guarantees the fast convergence rate of the ANN learning weights. The EKF
updating parameter for the ith element of ANN can be described by [159]:
θi (k) = [Wi (k), Vi,1 (k), ..., Vi,a+b (k)]T

(6.15)

where k is the kth sampling instant, and t = kτ . Using the EKF algorithm, the
ANN parameters will be updated in each sampling time as follows [159]
θi (k) = θi (k − 1) + ηi Ki (k)[yi (k) − ŷi (k)]
Ki (k) = Pi (k)Hi (k)[Hi (k)T Pi (k)Hi (k) + Ri (k)]−1

(6.16)

Pi (k + 1) = Pi (k) − Ki (k)Hi (k)T Pi (k)
where ηi is the learning coefficient, Pi (k) is the covariance matrix of the state estimation error, Ki (k) is the Kalman gain, and Ri (k) is the covariance matrix of the
estimated noise, which is computed recursively by [161]:


Ri (k) = Ri (k − 1) + eTi (k)ei (k) − Ri (k − 1) /k

(6.17)

Here, Hi (k) is the derivative of ei (k) with respect to θi (k). Based on the observer
input in Equation (6.11), Hi (k) can be calculated as follow
Hi (k) =
(
=

6.3.3

∂ei (k)
|θi =θi (k−1)
∂θi

σ(Zi (k)),

θi = Wi

Wi (k)Osi (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,j

Wi (k)ei (k − j)σ́(Zi (k)),

θi = Vi,a+j

(6.18)

Luenberger Observer

A Luenberger observer is designed to estimate the X̂, and it sends the observed data
to the ANN unit to reduce the computational load on the ANN. The ANN will use
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the difference between Luenberger observer and system output as an input to detect
the anomalies in the system. The rate of error for the proposed AD is defined as
˜
ˆ
Ẋ(t)
= Ẋ(t) − Ẋ(t),
and can be calculated by subtracting (6.10) from (6.1)
˙
X̃(t)
= AX̃(t) + D∆Pl + d(t) − LC X̃(t) − LOs (t)

(6.19)

Here, we neglected the nonlinear term D∆Pl to simplify the Luenberger design
because it will be identified with the ANN observer (Os (t)), which yields
˙
X̃(t)
= (A − LC) X̃(t), X̃(0) = X0

(6.20)

L is the Luenberger gain and should be defined in a way that the eigenvalues of the
A − LC are all negative real values, then, the estimation error will converge to zero
as t → ∞. L can calculated using pole placement method [228].

6.4

Controller Design

The proposed resilient control system consists of a linear quadratic regulator (LQR)
controller and a feedback controller based on the received information from the AD
system. The details of the control design and the stability analysis are illustrated
in the following subsections.

6.4.1

Resilient Controller

In LQR control theory, we minimize a predefined cost function
Z ∞
J=
[X(t)T QX(t) + u(t)Ru(t)]dt

(6.21)

0

where R > 0, and Q ≥ 0 are symmetric, positive (semi-) definite matrices. The
optimal control law using LQR approach is described by
u = −K(X(t))
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(6.22)
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Figure 6.1: Overall diagram of the proposed control system.

where K = R−1 B T P is the LQR control gain and P = P T > 0 is the solution of the
following Riccati equation
P A + AT + Q − P BR−1 B T P = 0

(6.23)

The resilient control law is defined as follows
u = −K(X − Os (t))

(6.24)

where K is the control gain that is obtained from the LQR technique, and Os (t) is
the AD signal. In case of an FDI attack in the system states, the AD system will
detect it in real-time and will subtract it from the states of the system. The overall
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diagram of the proposed resilient controller is depicted in Fig.6.1. The stability of
the proposed control system is investigated in the following section.

6.5

Stability Analysis of the Controller

Here, we investigated the stability of the proposed resilient control system. Consider
a general nonlinear system as follows

ẋ(t) = f (x(t)) + g(x(t))u(t)

(6.25)

y(t) = x(t) + A(t)
where x(t) is the state vector, f (x(t)) and g(x(t)) are functions which separate the
state parameters form the control funciton u(t), and A(t) is the anomaly occurred in
the system sensors. The following assumptions are considered in the stability proof
of the controller designed for system described in Eq.(6.1).
Assumption 1: The state function f (x(t)) can be differentiated at x̂(t)
β(t) =

∂f (x(t))
|x(t)=x̂(t)
∂x(t)

where β(t) is an n × n matrix.
Then, the Taylor series expansion of f (x) at x̂ can be presented as

f (x(t)) − f (x̂(t)) = β(t)x̃(t) + Θ(t)

(6.26)

where Θ(t) = o(kx̃(t)k2 ) contains the high order terms of the state estimation error.
Here, x̃(t) = x(t) − x̂(t).
Assumption 2: The control input function g(x(t)) satisfy the Lipschitz condition
with the Lipschitz constant Lg , i.e.,
kg(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))k ≤ Lg kx̃(t)k
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Assumption 3: The control input vector of the system is bounded by Lu and the
anomaly in the actuator, A(t), is bounded by LF , i.e.,

ku(t)k ≤ Lu
kA(t)k ≤ LF
Assumption 4: Θ is bounded by a positive real number LΘ such that
kΘ(x̂(t), x(t))k ≤ LΘ kx̃(t)k
Assumption 5: The matrix P (t), a symmetric matrix, that satisfies the following
condition:

λmin In ≤ P (t) ≤ λmax In
where λmin and λmax are positive real numbers and P (t) can be found by solving
the following Lyapunov equation:
β T (t)P (t) + P (t)β(t) + Ṗ (t) = −Γ

(6.27)

where Γ is a symmetric positive definite matrix.
Consider the observer equation as
x̂˙ = f (x̂(t)) + g(x̂(t))u(t) + L(y − ŷ)

(6.28)

ŷ = x̂(t) + Os (t)
where L is the Luenberger observer gain, and Os (t) is the ANN signal. Now, by
subtracting Eq.(6.28) from the Eq.(6.25), and substituting (6.26), the effect of the
anomaly detection error on the system x̃(t) can be written as
˙
ˆ
x̃(t)
= ẋ(t) − ẋ(t)

= β(t)x̃(t) + Θ(t) + g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t)) u(t)
+L(−x̃(t) + Os (t) − A(t))
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(6.29)

Theorem: With Assumptions 1-5, the FDI-attack effect in Equation (6.29) is bounded
on x̃(t) if the following condition is satisfied
ηmin (Γ) > 2LΘ λmax + 2Lg Lu λmax + 2LLa λmax

(6.30)

where kOs (t) − A(t)k ≤ La kx̃(t)k. λmax and La are both finite positive constant.
Proof: A Lyapunov function is selected as follows
V (x̃(t), t) = x̃(t)T P (t)x̃(t)

(6.31)

Based on Assumption 5, we can conclude that V (x̃, t) ≥ 0 for the estimation error
x̃(t). Now for the stability consideration of the proposed FTC system we need to
show that V̇ (x̃, t) < 0 The derivative of the V (x̃, t) with respect to time t can be
expressed as
˙ T P (t)x̃(t) + x̃(t)T Ṗ (t)x̃(t) + x̃(t)T P (t)x̃(t)
˙
V̇ (x̃, t) = x̃(t)
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(6.32)

˙
By substituting x̃(t)
in Equation (6.29) into V̇ (x̃(t), t) in (6.32), we have



V̇ (x̃, t) = β(t)x̃(t) + Θ(t) + g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t)) u(t)
T
+L(−x̃(t) + Os (t) − A(t)) P (t)x̃(t)

+x̃T (t) −β T (t)P (t) − P (t)β(t) − Γ x̃(t)


+x̃T (t)P (t) β(t)x̃(t) + Θ(t) + g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t)) u(t)

+L(−x̃(t) + Os (t) − A(t))

= x̃T (t)β T (t)P (t)x̃(t) + ΘT (t)P (t)x̃(t)
+uT (t) (g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)+
(Os (t) − A(t))T LT P (t)x̃(t) − Lx̃T (t)P (t)x̃( t)
−x̃T (t)β T (t)P (t)x̃(t) − x̃T (t)P (t)β(t)x̃(t) − x̃T (t)Γx̃(t)
+x̃T (t)P (t)β(t)x̃(t) + x̃T (t)P (t)Θ(t)
T

+x̃ (t)P (t) (g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))) u(t)
−x̃T (t)P (t)Lx̃(t) + x̃T (t)P (t)L(Os (t) − A(t))

= ΘT (t)P (t)x̃(t) + x̃T (t)P (t)Θ(t)
+uT (t) (g(x(t) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)
+x̃T (t)P (t) (g(x(t)) − g(x̂(t))) u(t)
+ (Os (t) − A(t))T LT P (x)x̃(t)+
x̃T (t)P (t)L (Os (t) − A(t)) − x̃T (t)Γx̃(t)

= 2ΘT (t)P (t)x̃(t) + 2uT (t) (g(x(t) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)
+2L (Os (t) − A(t))T P (t)x̃(t) − x̃T Γx̃(t)
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(6.33)

Now, substituting the conditions in Assumptions 2-5, we have
V̇ (x̃(t), t) = 2ΘT (t)P (t)x̃(t)
+2uT (t) (g(x(t) − g(x̂(t)))T P (t)x̃(t)
+2L (Os (t) − A(t))T P (t)x̃(t) − x̃T Γx̃(t)

(6.34)

≤ 2kP (t)kLΘ kx̃(t)k2 + 2Lg Lu kP (t)kkx̃(t)k2
+2kP (t)kLLa kx̃(t)k2 − Γkx̃(t)k2
≤ (−ηmin (Γ) + 2LΘ λmax + 2Lg Lu λmax + 2LLa λmax ) kx̃(t)k2
Hence, to have a stable resilient controller, we must have

−ηmin (Γ) + 2LΘ λmax + 2Lg Lu λmax + 2LLa λmax < 0
or
ηmin (Γ) > 2LΘ λmax + 2Lg Lu λmax + 2LLa λmax
which gives the sufficient condition of the stability. Thus, the condition given in
Equation (6.30) is sufficient to guarantee the convergence of the FDI-attack effect
x̃(t) on the system to a small bounded value.

6.6

Numerical Simulation Result

The performance of the proposed resilient control system against FDI-attacks is
investigated in this section. FDI attacks occur through malicious attempts and can
target a specific part of the system which can collapse whole the system operation.
In addition to the possibility of jamming communication links in the LFC system,
an attacker can penetrate to the system by GPS spoofing the PMUs [215]. Here,
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we assumed that the attacker spoofed the GPS by mimicking the GPS signal and
altered the GPS time estimation in the PMUs of the LFC [215, 216]. However, the
proposed method is a general method that can detect FDI attack from the other
sources as well, i.e., intrusion through the communication links. The GPS spoofing
will lead to wrong phase angle measurements which can deteriorate the efficiency of
the LFC system and even destabilize the system.
It is evident that a large amount of false data is easily detectable and can be filtered
using simple filter design, thus, in an intelligent attack, the amount of injected false
data is selected in the range of nominal performance of the system states. The
feedback signal of the controller under attack, π(•), can be expressed as
π(xi,l (t)) = xi,l (t) + αi,l (t)

(6.35)

where αi,m (t) is random variable which denotes the injected malicious signal (FDI)
or faults to the lth state of ith power area. Three scenarios have been considered
for α to examine the proposed control system on a two power area LFC system:
a single non-periodic FDI-attack, a single periodic FDI-attack, and simultaneous
FDI-attacks on different nodes/states. The numerical simulations are conducted
via MATLAB SIMULINK software.

6.6.1

Scenario I: Single non-periodic FDI attack

Here, we consider that the FDI attack occurs in the third state of the first power
area as follows:
α1,3 (t) =




0 t < 3

(6.36)



1 t ≥ 3
The third state of the power area is selected because this is the feedback state and
the hacker can inject the FDI attack and faults to this state. This fault starts at
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t = 3sec for the amount of 1 per unit (PU). The result in Fig.6.2 shows that our
proposed AD system can detect and track the inserted false data in real time. It
should be noted that the proposed detection technique is able to estimate faults
and attacks larger than perturbation due to its unique design approach. The performance of the proposed resilient controller is compared with an LQR controller,
and the results are shown in Figs.6.3 and 6.4. Fig.6.3 compares the LQR and the
proposed resilient controller performance in converging the states deviation to zero
in the presence of the attack in the first scenario. This figure clearly shows that the
proposed controller compensated for the attack effect and successfully damped it
without affecting other states. Fig. 6.4 compares the performance of the LQR and
the proposed controller in controlling the third state in the first scenario. As it can
be seen, the proposed controller has compensated the FDI-attack effect significantly.
In order to analyze the proposed AD detection numerically, the root mean square
error of AD system calculated using the following formula
s
RM SE =

2

ΣSi=1 (fi − f̂i )2
S

(6.37)

where S is the number of samples in the simulation process, fi is the injected false
data, and fˆi is the estimated one. The results are shown in the Table. 6.1. The
RMSE of the detection for the non-periodic FDI-attack is 0.0681, which shows the
accuracy of the proposed detection technique. The comparison of RMSE results
of FDI-attack compensation in Table. 6.1 also confirms that the proposed resilient
controller can significantly compensate for the effects of FDI-attack.
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Figure 6.2: The performance of the proposed AD system in the detection of the
scenario I.

6.6.2

Scenario II: Single periodic FDI attack

In this scenario, we consider that an adversary injected a sinusoidal signal to the
third feedback state of the first power area that can be described as follows:



0
t<3
(6.38)
α1,3 (t) =


2sin(2πt) t ≥ 3
The simulation results for the second scenario are shown in Figs.6.5 and 6.6. Figure
6.5 demonstrates that the proposed AD system can detect the FDI attack accurately.
The RMSE of detection error for this attack in Table. 6.1 denotes that the AD is
able to estimate and detect FDI attacks. The comparison between the performance
of the proposed resilient controller and LQR controller for the LFC system are given
in Fig.6.6 which shows the advantages of the proposed system in compensating FDI
attack effect.
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Figure 6.3: A comparison between the states of LFC system controlled with the
proposed resilient controller and LQR controller in the presence of the attack in the
first scenario.
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Figure 6.4: The performance comparison of the proposed resilient control system
with LQR controller in presence of the attack in the first scenario.

6.6.3

Simultaneous FDI attacks

In this scenario, a square wave shape attack is considered on two main states of the
LFC system (3rd and 8th states). These attacks occurs at the same time to examine
the proposed AD and control design in presence of simultaneous FDI attacks which
is the most difficult scenario for a detection system. Figs. 6.7 and 6.8 show the
simulation results for this scenario. As it can be seen in Fig.6.7, the proposed AD
system successfully detect the attack on both states. Table. 6.1 also confirms that
the proposed AD with RMSE of 0.095 has sufficient accuracy. Fig.6.8 demonstrates
that the proposed controller can significantly reduce the FDI-attack effect on both
states.
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Figure 6.5: The performance of the proposed AD system in the detection of a single
periodic FDI-attack in the second scenario.

Table 6.1: Analytical analysis of the proposed approach in detection and compensation of FDI-attack in the LFC system.
Anomaly
RMSE in AD RMSE in Resilient Control RMSE in LQR controller
Scenario I
0.0681
0.3144
0.9603
Scenario II
0.1219
0.2792
0.7076
Scenario III*
0.0952
0.3435
1.0489
*

For this case we calculated the average of accuracy in detection and compensation
of two attacks.

6.6.4

Discussion

A novel resilient control design for the LFC system is developed which can automatically detect and eliminate FDI attack with sufficient accuracy. The proposed
controller consists of a novel AD for online detection of FDI-attacks in the sensor
system of an LFC system and a controller that can compensate for the detected
anomaly in real-time. The simulation results and numerical comparison showed
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Figure 6.6: The performance comparison of the proposed resilient control system
with LQR controller in presence of a single periodic FDI-attack in the second scenario.

that the proposed control approach could detect and compensate for different kinds
of FDI attack. Unlike other research works, the proposed method is able to detect
simultaneous faults and attack on different states of the system. This ability helps
the system to defend against the total intrusion of an attacker. The other advantage
of the proposed approach is the elimination of the need for control reconfiguration
in the presence of attacks. Therefore, the complexity and cost of control design will
be decreased.
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Figure 6.7: The performance of the proposed AD system in the detection of two
simultaneous attack.

6.7

Conclusion

This chapter introduced a new resilient control architecture for LFC system in the
presence of FDI attacks in communication feedback line which transmits the sensors data. The proposed control technique consists of an AD system which detects
anomalies in the system using a Luenberger and an ANN observer, and a feedback
system to compensate for the FDI-attack in the real time. The stability of the
proposed control system against anomalies was mathematically proved using Lyapunov theory. The simulation results have shown that the proposed design is able
to detect the anomalies with sufficient accuracy and compensate their effect on the
LFC system. The proposed technique improved the resiliency and subsequently the
reliability of the power grid systems.
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Figure 6.8: The performance comparison of the proposed resilient control system
with LQR controller in presence of simultaneous FDI attacks on third and eighth
states of the LFC system.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

7.1

Conclusion

In this dissertation, the problem of fault in the control system was investigated, and
the state of the art methods in designing fault tolerant control (FTC) were reviewed
and their pros and cons were discussed. Generally, FTC techniques can be classified
into two major classes: active FTC and Passive FTC. Passive FTCs do not rely
on fault information to control the system and are closely related to robust control
systems while active FTC reacts to faults based on the size and the location of faults
which results to more intelligent reaction to fault occurrence. Thus, this research
work is based on the development of an efficient active FTC system. In order to improve the current active FTC techniques, a new fault detection and isolation (FDI)
technique and a novel active FTC system for actuators and sensors in nonlinear systems were developed. The efficiency and stability analysis of the proposed FDI and
the proposed active FTC technique were investigated and mathematically proven.
Using the proposed technique, FDI systems and active FTC systems have been designed for several different platforms, and the efficiency of the proposed technique
was demonstrated through numerical simulations.
The proposed FDI system incorporates the advantages of model-based observers and
learning-based observers by combining these two methods. The proposed hybrid FDI
method has higher accuracy than the model-based FDI strategies while deals with
less computation load in comparison with learning-based FDI techniques. In the
proposed design, a three-layer artificial neural network (ANN) was used for online
learning, and a model-based observer based on the dynamic model of the system was
designed and fed to the ANN to improve the accuracy and reduce the computation
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burden. Then, to improve the ANN performance, the extended Kalman filter (EKF)
was introduced to update ANN weights in realtime. The proposed application of
EKF in ANN led to a faster learning rate of the ANN and reduced the computation
time which makes the proposed design more efficient against abrupt faults.
The proposed active FTC design consists of the introduced FDI unit and new feedback structure to analytically compensate for the occurred fault in realtime. This
novel structure helps to tackle the fault problem in the actuators and sensors of
linear and nonlinear systems without the need of control reconfiguration. Particularly, when the weight and cost of the product have a major role in the design,
this technique can be a very beneficiary by reducing the design time (eliminating
reconfiguration scenarios) and product weight (eliminating redundancy).
The proposed active FTC were applied in designing flight control design of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Chapter 4. This flight controller design will help to
improve the reliability and safety of the flight system against unpredicted faults in
the actuator and sensors. The efficiency of the proposed design was demonstrated
against different fault scenarios, and the simulation result showed the advantages of
the proposed design compared with the state of the art active FTC strategies.
A resilient control framework for proton exchange membrane fuel cell (PEMFC)
system based on the proposed active FTC technique was introduced in Chapter 5.
This controller was able to detect the faults in the actuators of the air valve of
the PEMFC and compensate them in realtime. The proposed control design can
accurately detect, estimate and track the PEMFC actuators faults and failures, and
compensate for their negative impacts while following the desired control performances. This tolerance against faults and failures helps to maintain the PEMFC
gas pressures at the desired values, keeping the PEMFC in a desirable condition,
and subsequently, lengthen its lifetime by avoiding membrane damage.
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Finally, in Chapter 6, a resilient controller for load frequency control (LFC) of a
power grid system was designed based on the proposed active FTC technique. The
proposed controller was able to detect faults and false data injection (FDI) attacks
and compensate for their negative effects while achieving the desired control performances. The proposed control design could improve the resiliency and subsequently
the reliability of the power grid systems. Furthermore, the stability of the proposed control system against anomalies was mathematically proved using Lyapunov
theory.

7.2

Future Works

In this study, the proposed active FTC technique technique has been applied for
three different platforms, and the efficiency of the approach has been demonstrated
theoretically and numerically. However, this research work has the potential be
continued in three general aspects: 1) improving the FDI technique, 2) improving
the FTC system, 3) application

7.2.1

Improving FDI Accuracy

The proposed strategy for FDI was based on a combination of a model-based observer and the ANN. In this aspect, obtaining a more accurate model-based observer
would help to improve the accuracy of the FDI system. To this aim, the combination
of sliding mode observer (SMO) with ANN is suggested to leverage the robustness
of SMO against false data alarm and sensitivity of the ANN against the incipient
fault. Furthermore, we used EKF to update ANN weights while investigating new
algorithms, e.g., UKF, in the future may improve the accuracy of the FDI.
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7.2.2

Improving the FTC system

In this research work, an active FTC technique for the nonlinear system was introduced. Active FTC system relies on the accuracy of the FDI information and
delay in receiving this information or inaccuracy of this information would result
in an undesirable transient response. In order to prevent this transient response,
a combination of active FTC and passive FTC is suggested. The suggested hybrid
FTC algorithm would benefit from the advantages of active FTC (reacting to fault
intelligently) and passive FTC (desirable transient response).

7.2.3

Applications

This research applied the proposed active technique to three different platforms
to obtain efficient performance against faults and failures in sensors and actuators. However, there are other applications with the need for reliable controllers
that would need attention. For example, the network control system is one of the
complicated platforms that fault and failure in one of its components would have
catastrophic results. Thus, designing an active FTC system for network control
system can be considered as the future goal of this research.
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